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THE DESIGN OF A CARBON TAX
Gilbert E. Metcalf*
David Weisbach**
We consider the design of a tax on greenhouse gas emissions for the United States.
We consider three major issues: the tax rate (including the use of the revenues and
rate changes over time), the optimal tax base, and internationaltrade concerns. We
show that a well-designed carbon tax can capture about 80% of U.S. emissions by
taxing only a few thousand taxpayers, and almost 90% with a modest additional
cost. We recommendfull or partialdelegation of rate setting authority to an agency
to ensure that rates reflect current information about the costs of carbon emissions
and abatement. Adjustments should be made to the income tax to ensure that a
carbon tax is revenue neutral and distributionallyneutral. Finally, we propose an
origin-basissystem for trade with countries that have an adequate carbon tax, and a
system of border taxes for importsfrom countries without a carbon tax. We suggest
a system that imposes presumptive border tax adjustments, but allows an individual
firm to prove that a different rate should apply. The presumptive tax could be based
on average emissions for production of the item by either the exporting country or
the importing country.
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INTRODUCTION

This Paper considers the design of a tax on greenhouse gases
("GHGs"). The purpose of such a tax, which we will generally refer to as a
carbon tax, is to internalize externalities associated with anthropogenic climate change.' Without a carbon tax, individuals face a distorted set of
prices. Activities that result in carbon emissions are relatively too cheap
because individuals will not consider the costs the emissions impose on
others, including on future generations. A tax forces individuals to consider
the full set of consequences from emissions.
The theory behind using taxes to internalize externalities dates back
seventy years to writings by Pigou, but there is little experience with the
design of these taxes and almost none with a "Pigouvian tax" that covers a
substantial portion of the economy, as would a carbon tax.' There are several existing carbon taxes, but all are comparatively narrow or are otherwise
badly designed.3 There have also been several proposed carbon taxes intro-

'As we will discuss below, there are a wide variety of GHGs other than carbon dioxide.
For a list of GHGs, see Susan Solomon et al., Technical Summary, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 - THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 19, 33
tbl.TS.2 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgi/ar4-wgl-ts.

pdf. We refer to the tax generically as a carbon tax with the understanding that it will likely
cover a wide variety of GHGs. We will not discuss the science behind anthropogenic climate
change.
2 See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-93 (Transaction Publishers
2002) (4th ed., rev. prtg. 1952). For a review of the theory behind environmental taxes, see A.

Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1471 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). A number of papers consider design issues from a general perspective, such as how to set the tax
when there are administrative costs of collection. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven

Shavell, Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, 19 J. PUB. ECON. 385 (1982).
3 See discussion infra Part I.B.
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duced into legislation in the United States, but only in skeletal form. 4 Although one can learn from these examples, they do not serve as adequate
models for the best possible design of a carbon tax.
We consider three central design issues: the tax rate (including distributional issues, the use of the revenues, and tax rate changes); the tax base
(including possible offsets or credits); and international trade concerns. Although the theory behind setting the rate is well known - it should equal
the marginal harm from emissions - there are a number of difficult design
considerations.5 The most significant challenge is the design of a system for
ensuring that the rate changes over time as new information becomes available about the costs and benefits of reducing emissions. The central problems
in addressing climate change include uncertainty about its effects and uncertainty about the costs of abatement. The best available option is to utilize a
crude estimate of the optimal rate and adjust the rate as new information
arises. We suggest a delegation or partial delegation of rate-setting authority
to an expert agency, which will ensure that the tax rate is reexamined at
appropriate intervals and will provide expertise in the relevant parameters
for setting the rate. Given the size of the tax and the potential winners and
losers from rate changes, full delegation may not be possible, in which case
we recommend a number of intermediate regimes. We also discuss the use
of the revenues, recommending a revenue neutral and distributionally neutral
adjustment to the income or payroll taxes.
With respect to the tax base, we show that collecting the tax upstream
would make it possible to accurately and cheaply cover 80% of U.S. emissions by collecting the tax at fewer than 3000 points, and that it would be
possible to cover close to 90% of U.S. emissions at a modest additional
cost. 6 As the base gets broader, the collection costs increase; the tradeoff
between the increased collection costs and the benefits of a broader base
determines the optimal tax base. The main problem presented by upstream
collection is that a tax credit or offset must be given for fossil fuels that are
not combusted. For example, if the tax is imposed at the refinery and some
distillates are sequestered into products such as asphalt, the tax will be too
broad. We discuss how such a credit system would be designed.

'For example, in the 10th Congress, the House introduced two bills. See Save Our
Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 2069, 110th Cong. (2007); America's Energy Security Trust Fund
Act of 2007, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong. (2007). Rep. John Dingell also put forth a proposal but
did not actually introduce it. In the current session of the 111 th Congress, H.R. 3416 has been
reintroduced. See America's Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111 th Cong.
(2009).
5 The optimal tax rate in a second-best world is a bit more complicated. See discussion
infra Part II.A.
6 The 80% figure represents the share of U.S. CO 2e emissions consisting of CO from
2
fossil fuel combustion, virtually all of which could be included in the tax base by imposing the
tax at a relatively small number of upstream points, as discussed in Part IHB., infra. The 90%
figure reflects our judgment that, in addition to this initial 80%, it would be feasible to include
in the tax base non-fossil-combustion sources accounting for roughly half of the remaining
U.S. CO 2e emissions, as discussed in Part HI.C., infra.
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The third design issue relates to trade in carbon-intensive goods. We
argue that border tax adjustments for a carbon tax are necessary and appropriate. There is, however, no simple and clearly legal method of implement-

ing a system of border tax adjustments to prevent so-called carbon
"leakage," the shifting of production to countries without a carbon pricing
mechanism. The key problem is that to set the border tax adjustment, information is needed about the particular production technology and sources of
energy used to produce an item. In contrast, border tax adjustments under a
value-added tax ("VAT") require only readily available data: for imports,
knowledge of the item's price, and for exports, verification of export.7 The
necessary information may be difficult to obtain for a carbon tax.
We consider a number of possible options and their legality, recommending a system of presumptive border tax adjustments that allow individual firms to provide evidence of lower emissions. The presumptive border
tax can be based on average emissions from the production of like products
in either the exporting or importing country. Using information from the
exporting country is preferable, but obtaining that information may be more
difficult, and using it raises additional trade-related legal issues.'

While this Article deals with a carbon tax in the United States, many of
the same issues arise under any market-based scheme for regulating carbon
emissions in developed and perhaps also in certain developing nations. Capand-trade systems are currently the favored carbon pricing mechanism. The
European Union uses a cap-and-trade system for compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol, 9 and cap-and-trade systems have been considered by the U.S. Con-

gress. 10 Although there are many reasons for preferring a tax," if a cap-and7For a description of how VATs and consumption taxes work, see David A. Weisbach,
Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 603-13 (2000); CHARLES E. McLURE, JR.,
THE VALUE-ADDED TAX: KEY TO DEFICIT REDUCTION?

15-20, 23-25 (1987).

See discussion infra Part V.
9 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
10See, e.g., Resources for the Future, Summary of Market-Based Climate Change Bills
Introduced in the 10th Congress (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Docu
ments/1 Oth_- LegislationTableGraph.pdf (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review).
" Many articles discuss the advantages of a tax over a cap-and-trade system. See, e.g.,
Michael Hoel & Larry Karp, Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant, 24 RESOURCE &
ENERGY ECON. 367 (2002); Larry Karp & Jiangfeng Zhang, Regulation of Stock Externalities
with Correlated Abatement Costs, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE EON. 273 (2005); William D.
Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming, 1 REv.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 26 (2007); Marc J. Roberts & Michael Spence, Effluent Charges and
Licenses under Uncertainty, 5 J. PUB. EON. 193 (1976); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs.
Quantities, 41 REV. EcON. STUD. 477 (1974). Most of these discussions focus on theoretical
issues such as the deadweight loss from error.
We note that from an administrative perspective a carbon tax can be more quickly implemented than a cap-and-trade system. Coal producers already pay an excise tax to fund the
Black Lung Disability Fund and oil producers pay a tax to fund the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Federal Tax Policy Towards Energy, 21 TAX POL'Y & ECON.
145, 151-53 (2007) (describing these funds). We also have precedents in federal fuels tax
credits for refundable credits for sequestration activities. See id. at 162. In contrast, we have
no administrative structure in place for running a carbon cap-and-trade program. The Acid
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trade system is ultimately adopted, most of the design issues for the tax will
be relevant for a cap-and-trade system. For example, it is likely that the
United States will want to use the same point in production for remittance of
a tax and for the imposition of a permit requirement. Carbon leakage also
raises similar issues under both a cap-and-trade regime and under a tax.
Thus, a detailed consideration of how to implement a carbon tax can inform
the discussion of how best to implement a cap-and-trade system should a
cap-and-trade system end up being chosen as the carbon pricing mechanism.
Our focus here is on a tax implemented in a developed country. We
have the United States in mind, and use U.S. data, but the considerations
may be similar in other developed countries, even if some particulars
change. Other issues may arise in developing countries: for example, tax
enforcement may not be as robust, and the sources of emissions are likely to
be very different (with agriculture and deforestation playing a larger role and
energy a smaller role).
Our goal is to consider the design of an ideal tax, a tax that best trades
off the internalization of emissions externalities with administrative and collection costs. We do not generally consider the political concessions that
will be necessary to enact the tax, leaving that to the give-and-take of the
political process. Although we understand that a tax as actually enacted will
likely be different from an ideal tax, a model tax can serve as the baseline
from which the political process can do its work.
Part I provides background on GHG emissions and the various regulatory regimes used currently to control them. Part II discusses principles related to rate setting, including the use of the tax revenues and adjustment for
distributive effects of the tax. Part III addresses the tax base. It begins with
a discussion of the theory of setting the optimal base. It then turns to the
details of the various production systems and discusses how best to collect a
tax on various types of emissions. Part IV considers sequestration and other
carbon-reducing activities that should receive tax credits. Part V analyzes
the interaction of a carbon tax with trade rules. Part VI discusses interactions with other domestic regulations and taxes that affect carbon emissions.
Part VII concludes.
I.

EMISSIONS AND CURRENT CONTROL MECHANISMS

As background to understanding how best to design a carbon tax regime in the United States, we begin with a review of U.S. GHG emissions.
We also briefly review carbon pricing policies in other countries.

Rain Program is a helpful precedent, but the value of permits is an order of magnitude smaller
than the potential value of carbon emission permits. It also is highly concentrated among a
small set of electric utilities. For an overview of the Acid Rain Program, see U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Acid Rain Program (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/
basic.html (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
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Emissions

According to the 2008 Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks ("EPA Inventory") prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),' 2 the United States emitted about seven billion metric
tons of carbon dioxide ("CO2") equivalents in 2006,11 roughly 20% of
worldwide emissions (not counting emissions from land use change).' 4 This
amount consists of emissions of CO 2 and emissions of other gases such as
methane and nitrous oxide that also contribute to the greenhouse effect. It is
conventional to convert the emissions of other gases to CO2 equivalent
amounts ("CO 2e") by determining how much CO 2 would have to be emitted
to have the same effect on the climate. The conversion factors are known as
global warming potentials ("GWPs"). 5 Methane, for example, has a 100year GWP of twenty-one, which means that a ton of methane has the same
climate forcing impact as twenty-one tons of CO 2. Researchers and policy
12 Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
("UNFCCC") must provide inventories of their GHG emissions. The U.S. inventory is done
by EPA following guidelines set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC")
pursuant to the UNFCCC. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-08-005, INVENTORY
OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2006 (2008) [hereinafter EPA INVENTORY], available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads/08_CR.pdf. The
most recent EPA Inventory available in the period when this article was being prepared includes data through 2006. Much of our data is based on this source.
13 See id. at 2-1. Net emissions in the United States gross emissions less carbon sinks
- were approximately 6.2 billion metric tons. See id. at 1-12 tbl.1-4. Carbon sinks are measured in the EPA report as those arising from land use, land use changes, and forestry activities
("LULUCF"). See id. at 1-11.
14In 2005, U.S. GHG emissions equaled 18.44% of the worldwide total. Authors' queries
to World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), Online Database Version 6.0 (2009), http://cait.wri.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2009) [hereinafter CAIT] (on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
'" Calculation of GWPs is not straightforward. The problem is that different gases have
different lifetimes in the atmosphere, so determining GWPs involves aggregating over time.
Current inventories of GHG emissions use the 100-year GWPs calculated by the IPCC. See
Solomon et al., supra note 1, at 33 tbl.TS.2. To avoid some of the problems with discounting,
the IPCC also reports the GWPs over various time periods. The following is a selection of
100-year GWPs for important gases along with their associated U.S. emissions (in CO 2e) in
million metric ton ("MMT'") units:

GWPs and 2006 GHG Emissions
CO 2e

Carbon Dioxide
Methane
Nitrous Oxide
Hydrofluorocarbons
Perfluorocarbons

(MMT)
5,983.1
555.3
367.9
124.5
6.0

Sulfur Hexafluoride
17.3
Total
7,054.2
Source: EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at ES-3 tbl.ES-l, ES-5 tbl.ES-2.
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makers have settled on a 100-year window for measuring the GWP by convention although this is somewhat arbitrary.16 All of the numbers used in
this Article are in CO 2e units unless otherwise indicated.
In 2006, 80% of U.S. GHG emissions were CO 2 emissions from the
combustion of fossil fuel.'7 Petroleum use makes up 34% of total emissions,
coal makes up 29%, and natural gas makes up 16%.18 Non-energy uses of
fossil fuel as well as other miscellaneous uses add a modest amount of additional emissions.19 Of the three fossil fuels, coal has the highest carbon content per unit of energy (ranging from 93 to 104 kg of CO 2 per million BTUs
("MMBtu") depending on the type of coal), followed by petroleum (74 kg
of CO 2 per MMBtu for crude oil) and natural gas (54 kg of CO 2 per
MMBtu).20
The four major uses of fossil fuels are industrial, transportation, residential, and commercial. Industrial emissions account for nearly 29% of
total U.S. emissions. 2' Roughly two-thirds come from direct combustion of
and the remainfossil fuels to produce steam or heat for industrial processes,
22
ing one-third comes from electricity use by industry.
Transportation makes up the second largest category of emissions, with
nearly 28% of all U.S. emissions. 23 Transportation emissions come almost
exclusively from petroleum. Over 60% of transportation emissions are from
use. Most of the remainder comes from heavy-duty vehipersonal vehicle 24
cles and aircraft.
Residential and commercial end-uses each make up about 17% of emis2
These sources rely heavily on electricity, with the remaining emissionsY.
26
from natural gas or petroleum used for heating and cooking.
coming
sions
Electricity acts as an intermediate source of emissions - emissions
result from the generation of electricity, which is then used by consumers in
the four categories listed above. Emissions from the generation of electricity
were included in the end-use numbers reported above, but as a separate category, electricity accounts for 34% of total emissions. 27 The type of fuel used
for electricity generation has a significant effect on emissions. Electricity
can be generated through non-emitting methods - hydroelectric, nuclear, or
" See EPA

INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 1-6.
17Id. at ES-7.
18See id. at 3-4 tbl.3-3 (providing U.S. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by fuel

type); id. at 2-1 (providing total U.S. GHG emissions).
'9 See id. at 2-4 tbl.2-1.
20 See

Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse

Gases Program: Emission Factors and Global Warming Potentials, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/1605/emissionfactors.html (follow "Fuel Emission Factors" hyperlink) (last visited Apr.
9, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
21See
22See
23See

EPA
id.
id.

See id. at
id. at
id. at
27See id. at
24

25 See
26 See

INVENTORY,

supra note 12, at 2-21 tbl.2-14.

2-24 tbl.2-15.
2-21 tbl.2-14.
2-26.
2-18 tbl.2-12.
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geothermal energy - as well as through emitting methods - combustion of
coal, natural gas and various petroleum distillates. Almost all coal used in
the United States (93% in 2007) is used for electricity generation. 8 Conventional use of coal to generate electricity is by far the highest-emitting method
of generating electricity. Figure 1 summarizes U.S. fossil fuel emissions,
expressed in millions of metric tons ("MMT"), keeping electricity as a separate category.
FIGURE 1.

CO 2 EMISSIONS

(MMT)

FROM

FOSSIL

SECTOR AND FUEL TYPE

FUEL COMBUSTION BY

29

2,500

2,000
1,5 0 0

................
.......................
..............
..........
..............
..........
.............................................

1,000
500

Residential

Commercial
U Coal

Industrial

B!Natural Gas

Transportation

Electicity

U Petroleum

Table A gives a list of the major sources of GHG emissions in the
United States. The top source outside of fossil fuel combustion, agricultural
soils management, produced 265 MMT CO2 e in 2006, while fossil fuel combustion produced 5637 MMT, more than twenty-one times that amount. Cement production (i.e., emissions associated with the production process
itself, not from the fossil fuel energy used in the process) caused direct emissions of 45 MMT CO2 e, which is less than one one-hundredth of overall
fossil fuel emissions. Nevertheless, these non-fossil-fuel energy sources together make up about 20% of U.S. emissions.

28 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0384, ANNUAL ENERGY REvmw 2007, at xxix fig.39 (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf.
29Data taken from EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 3-4 tbl.3-3.
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Rank
1
2
3

5
6
8

15

17

A.

GHG

SOURCES ABOVE

Source
Fossil Fuels
Agricultural Soil
Management
Non-Energy Use
of Fuels
Enteric
Fermentation
Landfills
ODS Substitutes
Natural Gas
Systems (methane)
Coal Mining
Iron and Steel
Production
Cement
Manufacturing
Manure
Management
Mobile
Combustion
Natural Gas
Systems (C0 2)
Petroleum
Systems
Forest land
remaining forest
Wastewater
Treatment
Municipal Solid
Waste Combustion
Total
U.S. Total

20 MMT

CO 2 E IN

MMT

200630

Gas

CO 2e

CO 2

5,637.0

% of
Total
79.9

N20

265.0

3.8

83.7

CO 2

138.0

2.0

85.6

Methane

126.2

87.4

Methane
HFC

125.7
110.4

89.2
90.8

Methane

102.4

92.2

Methane

58.5

93.0

CO 2

49.1

93.7

CO 2

45.7

0.6

94.4

Methane

41.4

0.6

95.0

N20

33.1

0.5

95.4

CO 2

28.5

0.4

95.8

Methane

28.4

0.4

96.2

Methane

24.6

0.3

96.6

Methane

23.9

0.3

96.9

CO 2

20.9

0.3

97.2

Cumulative
% of Total
79.9

6,858.8
7,054.2

While emissions from each of these non-fossil-fuel energy sources are
relatively small, some of these sources are good candidates for inclusion in
the tax base. As we will discuss below, in determining what should be
taxed, marginal abatement costs - how much it costs to achieve an incremental unit of abatement - matter more than the total size of emissions
from a given source. To minimize the total cost of abatement, the tax base
30 Adapted from EPA INVErrORY, supra note 12, at ES-5 tbl.ES-2.
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must include low marginal abatement cost items even if their total contribution to emissions is small. For example, if it is easy to reduce methane
emissions from landfills, it may be important to include them in the tax base
notwithstanding the modest amount of these emissions. Many items with
low marginal abatement costs will be unrelated to fossil fuels.3'
Worldwide emissions of GHGs were 42 billion metric tons (42,000
MMT) CO 2e in 2005.32 Energy use is a relatively smaller component of the
worldwide total than it is for the United States, comprising just over 75% of
worldwide emissions, compared to 87% of U.S. emissions.33 Land use
34
change, particularly deforestation, is a significant contributor worldwide.
Preventing deforestation in highly forested nations such as Indonesia and
Brazil is likely to be a low-cost method of abatement;3 5 it would therefore be
important to include in a global climate policy. Similarly, emissions from
agriculture make up about 16% of worldwide emissions but only 6% of U.S.
36

emissions.

B.

Existing Carbon Control Regimes

Neither the United States nor the rest of the world makes any significant use of taxes explicitly on carbon. There are currently only six countries
explicitly taxing carbon (five Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom). There are, however, a wide variety of taxes on, and subsidies for,
energy (as well as a wide variety of regulatory regimes for other GHGs).
Although not designed to set a uniform price for carbon across different
types of energy, these taxes and subsidies will undoubtedly affect carbon
emissions. A survey of energy taxes in twelve countries revealed that, as of
2000, the vast majority of energy taxes are on gasoline and diesel fuel, with
very few taxes on coal and natural gas.37

All of the Scandinavian countries adopted carbon taxes in the 1990s.
These taxes have narrow bases and do not impose a uniform tax on emissions from the sources that they do cover. Instead, they provide a wide
variety of different rates.38 The Norwegian carbon tax covers about 64% of
31 See JOHN

M.

REILLY, HENRY

D.

JACOBY

& RONALD G.

PRINN, MULTI-GAS CONTRIBU-

TORS TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: CLIMATE IMPACTS AND MITIGATION COSTS OF NON-CO 2
GASES 23-24 (2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Multi-Gas.pdf.
32 Authors' calculations based on queries to CAIT, supra note 14 (on file with the Harvard

Environmental Law Review).
33 Authors' queries to CAIT, supra note 14 (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review).
34 Id. (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
31 See Georg Kindermann et al., Global Cost Estimates of Reducing Carbon Emissions
Through Avoided Deforestation, 105 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SCL U.S. 10,302, 10,305 (2008).
36 Authors' queries to CAIT, supra note 14 (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review).
17 See Andrea Baranzini, Jose Goldemberg & Stefan Speck, A Future for Carbon Taxes,
32 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 395, 398 (2000).
3
1 See Paul Ekins & Terry Barker, Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trading, 15 J.
EcON. SURV.

325, 341 (2001).
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CO 2 emissions and 49% of total GHG emissions.3 9 According to Nicholas
Stern, the impact of the tax is weakened by numerous exemptions related to
competitiveness concerns. 40 Moreover, the tax does not accurately reflect
variations in emissions across fuels. Finally, even though the Scandinavian
countries are relatively similar and each adopted a carbon tax, they differed
considerably in what they included in the tax base and what tax rate they
applied to different sectors.4 This makes it difficult for these neighboring
countries to harmonize their taxes.
The United Kingdom instituted a climate tax (known as the climate
change levy or "CCL") in 2001.42 The levy is imposed on industrial and
commercial use of energy, and excludes transportation and domestic (residential) use. The rate is currently modest. For example, electricity is
charged as £4.56 per megawatt hour ("MWh"). Gas is taxed at £1.59 per
MWh. 43 At the prevailing end-use prices for residential electricity and natural gas in 2007, this tax amounts to 4.6% on electricity and 5.2% on natural
gas.44 Moreover, taxpayers can enter into agreements with the government
to reduce emissions in exchange for a significantly reduced rate of tax, effectively converting the climate change levy into a command-and-control regulation. Total collections from the levy are around £700 million ($1 billion)
45
annually.
If the United States were to adopt a carbon tax, an important design
issue would be how it interacted with other carbon pricing and energy policies both domestically and abroad. Internationally, the major program with
which a domestic tax would have to interact is the European Union Emis3 See Annegrete Bruvoll & Bodil Merethe Larsen, Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Norway: Do Carbon Taxes Work?, 32 ENERGY POL'Y 493, 498 (2004) (noting carbon tax covers

64% of CO 2 emissions). Norway's total GHG emissions in 2000 were 53.8 MMT CO 2e, including 41.1 MMT CO 2. See NOR. POLLUTION CONTROL AuTH., NATIONAL INVENTORY RE2005 NORWAY: GREENHOUSE GAS EMissIONS 1990-2003 REPORTED ACCORDING TO THE
UNFCCC GUIDELINES 10 (2005), available at http://www.sft.no/publikasjoner/luft/2097/ta
2097jdf.
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEw 386
(2007).
41See Ekins & Barker, supra note 38, at 341.
42 For information on the CCL, see U.K. Dep't for Env't, Food & Rural Aff., Climate
Change Agreements: The Climate Change Levy (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.defra.gov.uk/
environmentlclimatechange/uk/business/cca/levy.htm (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review).
41 These rates were effective as of April 1, 2008. See Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs
Office (U.K.), Climate Change Levy (CCL): Changes to Rates, http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk
(search for "CCL changes to rates"; then follow "Climate Change Levy (CCL): Changes to
Rates" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review). As of Apr. 8, 2009, these taxes corresponded to $6.71 per MWh for electricity and
PORT

$2.34 per MWh for gas. Yahoo! Finance Currency Converter, http://finance.yahoo.com/
currency-converter (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review).
" Authors' calculations based on query to SourceOECD, lEA Energy Prices and Taxes,
http://www.sourceoecd.org/database/1683626X/energypricestaxes (last visited Apr. 22, 2009)
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).

" See

HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, BUDGET

2008, at 187 tbl.C6 (2008), availableat http:I/

www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud08_completereport.pdf.
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sions Trading System ("EU ETS"). 46 The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade program applicable to EU emissions from the energy industry and energyintensive industries. Phase I of the program ran from 2005 through 2007
and was viewed as a trial run to develop the market mechanisms to support
permit trading. Phase II, running from 2008 through 2012, is designed to
help the EU meet its Kyoto Protocol obligation of an 8% reduction below the
1990 levels). The burden-sharing allocation
base year levels (generally
4
within the EU is complex. 1
We do not discuss the merits of the EU ETS in this Article but do wish
to comment on two aspects of its design. First, the EU system is implemented at the level of the industry or electric utility. This point of regulation
significantly multiplies the number of covered installations and makes a
comprehensive system difficult to implement. Second, the EU ETS only
covers a relatively small portion of GHG emissions in the EU. The European Commission estimates that less than one-half of CO 2 emissions and
less than one-third of all GHG emissions will be subject to the EU ETS caps
in 2010.48 In particular, the transportation sector is excluded. It has been
argued that the transportation sector was excluded from the EU ETS because
it was already subject to high taxes on motor fuels. 49 These energy taxes,
however, were presumably motivated by other externalities and costs associated with driving, though it might be argued that the rate is higher than
necessary. 0 Therefore, these taxes need to be imposed in addition to, rather
than as a replacement for, a carbon tax. Moreover, to the extent that an
element of these taxes did relate to carbon emissions, nothing precluded the
EU from including transport in the EU ETS and encouraging member countries to impose motor fuels taxes only to an extent that would correct for
non-carbon externalities from driving." To the extent EU motor fuels taxes
46

See generally

EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU
(2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/

EUROPEAN COMM'N,

EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM

brochures/ets en.pdf.
41

For a detailed description, see A.

DENNY ELLERMAN, BARBARA

K.

BUCHNER

&

CARLO

CARRARO, ALLOCATION IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: RIGHTS, RENTS AND
FAIRNESS

(2007).

48 Frank J. Convery & Luke Redmond, Market and Price Developments in the European

Union Emissions Trading Scheme, I REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 88, 93 (2007).
49 For a comparison of U.S. and EU gasoline tax rates, see Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Policy
for FinancingAlternative Energy Equipment, J. EQUIPMENT LEASE FINANCING, Spring 2008, at
1.
50 See Sijbren Cnossen, Tax Policy in the European Union: A Review of Issues and Policies, 58 FINANZARCHV 466, 504-05 (2001).
1' One obstacle to this swap was that the permits were given away and, as a result, national governments lost revenue. But the amounts in question were small. Average gasoline
tax rates in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") countries
other than the United States averaged $2.30 per gallon as of January 2007, according to the
OECD database on environmental taxes. Authors' calculation (unweighted average) based on
OECD/EEA, Economics Instruments Database, http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/
UnleadedPetrolEuro.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review). At the current price for EU ETS permits (in the neighborhood of 13 Euros), this
would raise the price of gasoline by about 150 per gallon. See European Climate Exchange,
http://www.ecx.eu (last visited Apr. 23, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
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are thought of as part of its carbon pricing regime, the EU has a hybrid capand-trade tax regime rather than a pure cap-and-trade regime.
None of these carbon pricing regimes serves as a good model for the
design of a carbon tax. All have comparatively narrow bases, and none is
designed to minimize compliance and administrative costs.
II.
A.

RATES

Setting the Rates

At the most basic level, the principles for setting the correct tax rate
were established long ago by Pigou: at any given level of emissions, the tax
rate should equal the social marginal damages from producing an additional
unit of emissions or, more or less equivalently, the social marginal benefit
from abating a unit of emissions." If the tax has to be set at a fixed rate, as
is likely in any broad-based tax, the optimal tax rate would be where the
marginal benefit of abatement equals the marginal cost of abatement. To set
such a tax, the government obviously would need to estimate both the marginal abatement cost curve and the marginal abatement benefit curve.
Estimates of the optimal tax rate vary widely. The calculation is difficult, perhaps even heroic, because it involves combining uncertain science,
including predictions of the local effects of climate change, with predictions
about economic and technological developments in the distant future. In
addition, all of these values must be discounted to the present.53 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") surveys 100 different
studies of the optimal tax rate and estimates a mean for 2005 of $12 per
metric ton of C0 2, but notes that estimates range from $3 to $95 per metric
ton. 4 The report adds that these figures are likely to underestimate the costs
55
of carbon emissions because of the difficulty in quantifying many impacts.
Review) (providing current EU ETS permit prices); Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Fuel and Energy Source Codes and Emission Coefficients, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
1605/coefficients.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review) (providing amount of carbon per gallon of gasoline); Yahoo! Finance Currency
Converter, http://finance.yahoo.comlcurrency-converter (last visited Apr. 23, 2009) (on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). If countries chose to include transport fuels in
the cap-and-trade system, thereby increasing fuel prices, and if they then chose to reduce transport fuel taxes to offset those price increases, they could recoup the lost tax revenue by auctioning (rather than giving away) a modest portion of the permits.
52 See PIoou, supra note 2, at 192-93.

11 For a discussion of the discounting debate, see Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major

Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for Evaluating National Energy Options, in DIscoUNTING
FOR TIME AND RISK IN ENERGY POLICY 21 (Robert C. Lind ed., 1982); Geoffrey Heal, Intertemporal Welfare Economics and the Environment, in 3 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENrTAL Eco-

NOMICS 1105 (Karl-Gbran Maler & Jeffery R. Vincent eds., 2005).
' See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 - IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 7, 17 (2007), available at

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
" See id.
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The revenue raised from such a tax would depend on the coverage and the
elasticity of emissions to taxation, but rough and ready figures suggest that a
alone would likely raise between
modest tax on emissions from fossil fuels
6
$75 billion and $100 billion per year.
Because of the difficulties in computing the optimal tax rate from estimates of social cost, an alternative used by some analysts is to determine a
set of taxes over time that would result in meeting a target for emissions
reductions or total carbon concentrations in the atmosphere. This approach
separates the analysis into two components: an overall social decision about
what level of GHG concentrations to tolerate and a technical analysis of how
best achieve that goal. When analysts take this approach and use likely
targets, the ranges of tax rates they produce are similar to those generated
from trying to find the social cost of carbon. 7
There is a longstanding debate about whether the tax rate should be
adjusted because of interactions with the labor tax. 8 The original view was
that environmental taxes create a "double dividend" because they internalize
environmental externalities and allow the distorting income tax to be reduced by the revenue that they raise.

9

The most recent view is that the

extent (and even the direction) of an adjustment to environmental taxes depends on subtle factors, such as the use of revenues and whether there are

pre-existing distortions. 60 For example, environmental taxes themselves may
reduce labor supply in much the same way as a labor tax. Therefore, substituting an environmental tax for a labor tax may not reduce such distortions.
Regardless of the details of this debate, given the heroic assumptions needed
to compute the optimal carbon tax rate, the double-dividend hypothesis is a
second-order consideration - determining the carbon tax rate at this point
16 See GILBERT E. METCALF ET AL., ANALYSIS OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS TAX PROPOSALS
31-32 (2008), available at http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC-Rptl60.
pdf (providing revenue estimates for several carbon tax bills). The authors' estimates range
from $69 billion to $126 billion for revenue raised in 2015 from relatively narrow taxes. Id. at
31 tbl.9. To put this in context, a carbon tax of $25 per metric ton CO 2e would raise the price
of gasoline by about 22¢ per gallon and the price of coal-fired electricity by roughly 2.5¢ per
kilowatt-hour. A carbon tax would also increase the price of other commodities that use energy as an intermediate good. See Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The

Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and RegionalAnalysis, 30(2)

ENERGY

J. 157, 175

app. tbl.1 (2009) (estimating that a $15 per ton tax would raise the purchase price of a new
automobile by about 0.9%).
" For a comparison of economic models of climate change using similar emissions scenarios, see LEON E. CLARKE ET AL., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, SCENARIOS OF
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATIONS: SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT PRODUCT 2.1A (2007), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/

finalreport/sap2- Ia-final-all.pdf.
5 See A. Lans Bovenberg & Ruud A. de Mooij, Environmental Levies and Distortionary
Taxation, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1085, 1085 (1994); Lawrence H. Goulder, Ian W.H. Parry &
Dallas Burtraw, Revenue-Raising Versus Other Approaches to EnvironmentalProtection: The
Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions,28 RAND J. ECON. 708 (1997); Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did
You Really Expect Something for Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 221 (1998).

9 See, e.g., Bovenberg & de Mooij, supra note 58, at 1085.
0 See Louis KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 212-16 (2008).
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involves guessing about orders of magnitude and not about potentially subtle
adjustments.
B.

Revenue and Redistribution

Depending on one's frame of reference, a carbon tax is likely to be
modestly to highly regressive. Using data from 2003, Table B shows the
distributional burden of a $15 per ton carbon tax across households. 6
TABLE

B.

Income Decile
Bottom
Second

CARBON TAX BURDEN ACROSS INCOME GROUPS

62

Direct
2.12
1.74

Indirect
1.60
1.31

Total
3.74
3.06

Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh

1.36
1.19
0.97
0.85
0.69

0.99
0.88
0.78
0.68
0.61

2.36
2.06
1.76
1.53
1.30

Eighth
Ninth
Top

0.61
0.53
0.36

0.63
0.49
0.45

1.23
1.01
0.81

Based on the practice in European VAT systems of zero rating and exemptions, 63 one might ask whether similar exemptions should be built into

the carbon tax to reduce its regressivity. The answer is no. Redistributing
income or wealth through adjustments to a commodity tax is in general less
efficient than redistributing through adjustments to direct taxes on labor or
income. 64 Thus, the distributive effects of a carbon tax should be offset
through adjustments to the overall tax system (in particular, the income tax)
61 Hassett et al. assess the distribution of the tax across households using both annual
income and two proxy measures for lifetime income and find that the tax appears considerably
less regressive when a lifetime income measure is used. See Hassett et al., supra note 56, at
168-69; see also METCALF ET AL., supra note 56, at 3, 39-41 (showing that over time, more of
the carbon tax is passed back to resource owners and owners of capital, also somewhat mitigating the regressivity).
62 Hassett et al., supra note 56, at 164. The table reports the within-decile average carbon
tax burdens as percentages of annual income. Direct burden refers to fuel consumption.
Indirect burden refers to higher prices of goods due to use of energy as an input. The sum of
direct and indirect differs from the total due to rounding error.
63 European VATs take the credit-invoice approach. They tax revenue from sales of products and provide a tax credit for VAT paid at previous stages of production. Zero rating means
that no tax is applied on sales, but a credit is still received for taxes paid at previous stages of
production. Exemption means that the product is simply not subject to the tax (and receives no
credit for previously paid VAT). See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Value-Added Taxation: A Tax Whose
lime Has Come?, J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1995, at 121, 125-26.
1 See A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect
Taxation, 6 J. PuB. EcON. 55, 74 (1976); Louis Kaplow, On the Undesirabilityof Commodity
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rather than through adjustments to the design of the carbon tax itself. In
particular, adjustments to the carbon tax for distributive effects produce the
same types of distortions that adjustments to labor income taxes do. For
example, progressive taxes reduce work incentives. In addition, adjusting
the carbon tax for distributive effects would reduce the environmental benefits of the tax: carbon emissions would not be priced equal to their marginal
damages. Therefore, the better approach is to design the carbon tax to best
internalize the effects of emissions and to adjust the income or payroll tax
for any distributive effects. This reflects the fact that distortions arise from
redistribution in the tax code.6 5
To a large extent, the design of a carbon tax is separable from the issue
of how to spend the money. Moreover, as noted, the potentially regressive
distributive effects of a carbon tax should be offset through adjustments to
the income tax rather than through adjustments in the design of the carbon
tax, so that distributive issues are also separable. Nevertheless, because the
revenue and distributive effects are significant, it is worth spending a few
words on these issues. We consider two alternatives.
Our first and preferred option is to maintain revenue and distributional
neutrality. Whatever the decision is on proper size of government and
proper deficit, the enactment of a carbon tax does not, and should not,
change it. So if the current judgment, right or wrong, is that the federal
government should be 19% of the economy, the enactment of a carbon tax
should not alter this percentage. Similarly, whatever the decision is on the
proper degree of progressivity of the tax system, the enactment of a carbon
tax should not, and need not, change these views. Under this argument,
carbon tax revenues should be used to 66reduce other taxes in a way that retains the same degree of progressivity.

Even if other taxes are adjusted to maintain overall progressivity, a carbon tax will have a disproportionate impact on certain industries, with the
coal industry being a prime example. But because of coal's very high carbon
content and the quantity of emissions from coal combustion, coal could not
reasonably be exempted from an effective carbon tax. This suggests the
need for transition assistance for coal industry workers who would be displaced as a result of a carbon policy. Such assistance need not be very
expensive.
The value added by the coal industry (labor compensation, owners'
profits, and indirect business taxes) amounted to $11 billion in 2005.67 If the
share of labor compensation in coal mining value added is unchanged from
Taxation Even When Income Taxation Is Not Optimal, 90 J. PUB. EcoN. 1235, 1238, 1246

(2006).

65 See KAPLOW, supra note 60, at 27.

6 For an example of such a proposal, see GILBERT E. METCALF, A PRoPOSAL FOR A U.S.
AN EQUITABLE TAX REFORM TO ADDRESs GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
(2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/10carbontax-metcalf.aspx.
67 E-mail from Shawn Snyder, Economist, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, to author (Aug. 20, 2007) (on file with author).

CARBON TAX SWAP:
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6
1997, when labor accounted for one-half of the value added in coal mining,
the maximum potential loss to labor is $5.5 billion annually. Demand will
fall sharply, but not to zero, so the loss in value added will be less than $11
billion annually. Moreover, as time goes on, participants in this industry can
begin to make adjustments to move into other sectors. Thus, any transitional
assistance should be temporary in nature, with particular attention paid to
those workers that are least able to transition to new jobs.
A second option is to spend some of the tax revenue to help shift toward a low-carbon economy. An increase in federal research funding for
basic energy-related research and development certainly would be beneficial. A number of studies suggest that a doubling of such funding could be
spent productively.6 9 This would require funds in the range of $4 billion per
year in addition to what is currently spent.70 This amount could be funded
through tax revenues or by removing subsidies to energy production that are
either unproductive or unnecessary in the presence of a carbon tax. By no
means would it be sensible to spend all of the carbon tax revenue on basic
research and development related to reducing GHG emissions.
Some funding will also be needed to move advanced technologies, such
as carbon capture and storage ("CCS"), to a large scale. The recent setback
in funding for FutureGen 7l is unfortunate and speaks to the large financial
risks facing firms that try to undertake such investments on their own. CCS
illustrates another set of issues requiring government action. A national
CCS system will require a network of pipelines to move carbon from generators to storage sites. This may require some funding by the government. 72
Similarly, low-carbon sources of energy, such as wind, may not be located
near population centers, which means that an enhanced transmission grid

68 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Gross-Domestic-Product-

by-Industry Accounts, 1947-2007, http://www.bea.gov/industry/gpotables/gpoaction.cfm
(follow "Composition of Gross Output by Industry" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 14, 2009) (on
file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
69
See RICHARD G. NEWELL, A U.S. INNOVATION STRATEGY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MIGATION 32 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/1 2_climate changenewell.aspx (citing studies and making proposal); see also JASON FURMAN ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROMOTE EN-

25 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/lOclimate
changejfurman.aspx (discussing proposals).
70 See NEWELL, supra note 69, at 32.
7' See, e.g., Editorial, The Demise of FutureGen, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2008, at A20.
72While funding will be required to build this network, equally important will be a review
and potential overhaul of state and federal regulatory systems to remove obstacles to the development of this network. Important questions in this review will include: At what level in the
federal system will regulatory oversight of this network take place? What is the right balance
between national interests in a CCS system and local property rights? Who will bear the
liability if stored carbon leaks in the near or long term? What insurance mechanisms will be
necessary to cover that liability? For a discussion of barriers and choices involved with CCS
deployment, see JoHtN DEUTCH ET AL., TffE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD 43-62 (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coalVIheFuture-of-Coal.pdf.
ERGY SECURITY
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may be required.73 Given the complex regulatory and land use issues in
building such a grid, federal involvement and funding may be necessary.
In addition, enhanced support for energy efficiency investments contributes to a reduction in energy consumption and carbon emissions. Increasing energy prices through a carbon tax will contribute to increased
efficiency investments, but two factors would support a policy of further
stimulating efficiency investments with more generous tax credits. First,
certain sectors of the economy may not respond to energy price increases
arising from a carbon policy. Commercial real estate and rental housing are
sectors where the economic agent who makes efficiency investments (the
developer or property owner) is not the person who benefits from the energy
savings (the tenant). Second, the hidden nature of many efficiency improvements makes it difficult to recapture the energy savings through their capitalization into building prices or rents. 74 In addition, empirical work suggests
that efficiency investment tax credits have a substantial impact on adoption
of such efficiency investments.75
In summary, we believe that, in large measure, funds from a carbon tax
should be used as part of a "carbon tax swap" that is revenue and distributionally neutral. 76 A small portion of the funds might be directed to providing transition relief for displaced workers (such as miners), supporting basic
energy research and development, solving vexing issues associated with
bringing CCS to scale, constructing any necessary transmission lines, and
perhaps encouraging conservation activities that market imperfections might
otherwise block. But we reiterate that the decision about how to spend carbon tax revenues is separate from the decision to enact a carbon tax.
C.

Initial Enactment and Grandfathering

There are a number of options for initial enactment of a carbon tax,
including a slow ramp-up of the tax, grandfathering existing emissions, and
immediate uniform adoption (a "cold-turkey" approach). A slow ramp-up
would gradually introduce the tax over time, perhaps by starting with a low
initial rate or a narrow initial base and then increasing the rate or base at a
pre-announced schedule to reach the desired system. Grandfathering would
exempt from taxation a baseline level of emissions, such as an amount equal
to emissions in a reference year. A cold-turkey approach would simply introduce the tax without any special provision for transition.

73 See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., ELECTRIC INDUSTRY CONCERNS ON THE RELIABLrrY IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES 11-12 (2008), available at http://www.nerc.

com/files/2008-Climate-Initiatives-Report.pdf.
74
See AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF
MARKET FAILURES IN THE END-USE OF ENERGY 2 (2007), available at http://www.aceee.org/
energy/IEAmarketbariers.pdf.
7' See, e.g., Kevin A. Hassett & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Energy Tax Credits and Residential
Conservation Investment: Evidence from Panel Data, 57 J. PUB. ECON. 201, 216 (1995).
76 See, e.g., METCALF, supra note 66, at 2.
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While cold-turkey introduction is likely the least politically feasible approach, it is our preferred option for two reasons. First, an immediate, uniform tax imposition maximizes what one might call the "anticipation
effect." If businesses understand today that the eventual carbon tax will be
imposed without special relief for existing investments, they will start adjusting their behavior now, anticipating the future effects of the tax. For
example, a utility constructing a power plant now is more likely to use gas
instead of coal if it is clear that the plant's future emissions will be fully
exposed to a future tax on carbon (gas being much less carbon-intensive than
coal). One can, in effect, think of cold-turkey as pushing some of the effects
77
of the policy earlier in time, which in this case is a good thing.
An argument against this sort of anticipation effect is that individuals
act, or should be allowed to act, without trying to guess future government
policy - they should be allowed to rely on current law. The government,
by passing current law, has effectively told people what their compliance
obligations are, and it is unfair to change those obligations midstream. This
argument, however, is circular. Individuals or industries only know they can
rely on unchanging rules (or grandfathering, if the rules do change) if there
is some external reason why that should be the case. For example, the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution allows property owners to rely on their
rights to prevent government takings.78 Taxes, however, change all the time
and there is no fairness reason why people should be able to rely on them not
changing. This is particularly true with respect to a carbon tax, as carbon
pricing policies have been widely discussed for a long time.
Our second reason for preferring a cold-turkey approach is that the revenues raised by a carbon tax are likely to be significant - in the range of
$100 billion per year79 - and those revenues can likely be spent in better
ways than grandfathering carbon emissions. For example, the taxes could be
used to reduce the income or payroll taxes. Alternatively, shifting to a lowcarbon economy may require significant changes in infrastructure, and some
of the tax revenues could be used to pay for those changes. As implied in
our discussion of the use of revenues, it is hard to imagine that there are not
better ways to spend the money than giving it to industries that currently
emit carbon. Grandfathering the energy sector also has been shown to have
perverse distributional consequences.8 0 The value of grandfathered permits
accrues to owners of capital, thereby exacerbating the undesirable distributional consequences of carbon pricing.
71 See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 54-57 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions,99 HARv. L. REV. 509, 551 (1986); DANIEL SHAViRo, WHEN RULES CHANrE: AN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACIVITY 27-32
(2000).
" U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5.
79
See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate
Change, 32 HARV. ENvTrL. L. REv. 293, 317 n.94 (2008).
80 See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 3 REV. ENvnL. EcoN. & POL'Y 63, 74 (2009).
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A slow ramp-up can be seen simply as an intermediate solution between grandfathering and cold-turkey. It is like grandfathering that is gradually phased out over time. Therefore, the same arguments apply to the
extent the phase-in is like grandfathering.
The possibility of grandfathering a carbon tax based on business-asusual emissions allows a carbon tax to have the same effect as a cap-andtrade system with free allocation of permits, if such a system were to be
desired. A cap-and-trade system can buy the support of blocking industries
to allow legislation to pass relatively efficiently through the free allocation
of allowances. This is relatively efficient because the blocking industry
would still face the right price at the margin; the industry would benefit from
any increase or decrease in emissions by an amount equal to the price of the
permits. One could claim that a tax must exempt the industry to buy it off,
which is less efficient. However, this is not true. An identical economic
outcome can be obtained in a carbon tax by taxing emissions above some
floor. This preserves the impact at the margin while exempting initial emissions in a lump-sum fashion."
D. Anticipated Rate Schedule

The optimal schedule of tax rates over time will depend on how the
target is being set. In a welfare-maximizing framework where the benefits
and costs of carbon abatement are both taken into account, the tax rate
should match social marginal damages across time.82 Where the goal is to
cap emissions at some fixed amount over a set time period, the tax rate
should grow at the rate of return on capital.83 Metcalf et al.84 develop the
argument as follows. They start by imagining that rather than imposing a
carbon tax, the government issues a set of permits that can be used over
time. The permits would be an asset. Holders would save that asset for later
use if its value went up more quickly than the rate of return on other assets,
but they would use it sooner if its value went up more slowly. In equilibrium, the price of permits would increase at the same rate as the return on
other forms of capital.85 Taxes and permits, however, are merely substitute
methods of imposing the Pigouvian price on emissions in the absence of
uncertainty. Therefore, if permits optimally have this price pattern, taxes
must as well.
William Nordhaus undertakes an explicit welfare-maximizing analysis
and finds that tax rates grow over time in a pattern that resembles exponen8 An interesting issue we have yet to fully resolve is why the EU ETS required participating countries to freely allocate permits instead of giving each local country the choice about
how to distribute them. This requirement is particularly puzzling in light of the inefficiency of
free allocation.
82 This analysis abstracts from other distortions that may affect the optimal tax rate.
83 This analysis abstracts away from risk or multiple forms of capital with different return
characteristics.
14 ME-rCALF Er AL., supra note 56, at 28-29.
85Id.
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tial growth.8 6 His model includes population growth, technology changes,
and non-constant discount rates. If there are technological surprises, the optimal tax rate will also adjust to take these into account. In general, in
broad-based general equilibrium models one would expect the optimal tax
rate to grow at an underlying exponential growth rate that is modified by
other forces at work in the model.
The real world is significantly more complicated than even the most
complex computable general equilibrium model. Multiple forms of capital
exist with different rates of return based on their risk characteristics. What
is the right capital rate of return to serve as a benchmark for the growth of
the carbon tax rate? The logic of the Metcalf et al. study suggests that the
appropriate form of capital would be that with similar risk characteristics to
the hypothetical permit program that is equivalent to the carbon tax. But
immediately this logic breaks down, since taxes and permit systems are no
87
longer equivalent in a world with uncertainty.
In practice, the best that may be possible is to set out a given real
growth rate for the tax rate (say, 4% or 5%) in carbon tax legislation and
anticipate the need to adjust the rate as more information becomes available.
We turn next to this issue.
E.

Rate Changes

Tax rates must be adjusted to reflect new information about the marginal cost and marginal benefit of abatement. New information is likely to
arise all the time as the science of climate change progresses and as abatement technologies are discovered and developed. The question is how often
to change the tax rate.
Many commentators have expressed concerns over the price volatility
associated with cap-and-trade systems because of worries that price volatility will reduce or delay long-term investment.88 It is not clear, however, why
carbon prices are different from any other sort of price. The price of a barrel
of oil changes all the time, and yet markets function and investment takes
place. Those who need price stability use futures markets or other hedging
techniques. On the other hand, there is a belief in the value of stability in
law, expressed in the judicial doctrine of stare decisis. Because the general
importance of stability in the law is unknown, the costs and benefits of rapid
changes to carbon prices are uncertain as well.
We need not resolve the issue of the optimal pace of change for laws there is surprisingly little literature addressing this point - because most
significant abatement opportunities involve long-term investments, such as
changing the structure of the power industry. This means that there will be
86 Nordhaus, supra note 11, at 42.

Weitzman, supra note 11, at 482.
See, e.g., DALLAS BURTRAW, KAREN PALMER & DANNY KAHN, A SyMMETRic
VALVE 2 (2009), availableat http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-06.pdf.
87

88
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little benefit from adjusting rates in the short run. If a utility is considering
the design of a power plant that has a fifty-year life, it probably would matter little whether the carbon tax were to adjust every year or every five years.
So if there were any cost to frequent changes, less frequent changes would
be preferred.

The question for the design of a carbon tax is whether there is some
mechanism for causing intelligent rate changes to happen at regular intervals. One possibility is to delegate the responsibility to set the rate to an
expert agency. An agency might be relatively free from political pressure
and would have the advantages of being able to revisit the rate at regular
intervals and of employing experts who are able to distill the complex information needed to determine the correct rate. Agencies commonly set prices
for significant items when they set electricity, airfare, and railroad rates.
Agencies have also been used to set tariffs. Although many of these pricing
decisions are now made in the private market, the government must set the
tax rate, and these examples illustrate the feasibility of delegation of similar
decisions. s9
If Congress is unwilling to delegate tax rate decisions of this scope to
an agency - the revenue numbers are large and many important industries
or regions can be hurt - intermediate solutions are available. An agency
could recommend a rate, and then various procedural rules could force Congress to consider the recommendation, or perhaps even give procedural protection to the recommendation. The military base closing commission might
serve as an example. 90 An even milder form of delegation is to require a
commission to meet on a regular basis to recommend rates. Although most
commissions have little effect, there have been some that have worked, notably the National Commission on Social Security Reform, chaired by Alan
Greenspan.
If an intermediate delegation system of this sort is not feasible, Congress might consider a system that forces reconsideration of the rate at regular intervals. Two obvious possibilities are a pre-scheduled rate that either
goes up quickly, forcing Congress to act to reduce it as necessary, or goes
down quickly (i.e., the tax expires), forcing Congress to increase it. Although this approach would mean that the nominal rate does not increase
exponentially, as would be desired in the absence of new information about
the marginal costs and benefits of abatement, it would force Congress to
consider new information about these marginal costs and benefits and potentially produce a better overall rate schedule.
89Various ways of framing the tax may change perceptions of whether delegation is appropriate. For example, if the tax is seen as a user fee, delegation may seem more appropriate.
Similarly, if carbon tax revenues are dedicated to a particular use, the entire system looks more
like traditional agency action as compared to the setting of a tax rate that raises general
revenues.
9°The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is authorized by Congress
through the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-5 10, § 2902
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006)).
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THE TAX BASE

We begin the discussion of the carbon tax base with a review of the
theory of how to set the base when there are measurement and collection
costs. We then turn to a discussion of particular sources of emissions, focusing first on fossil fuels and then on other sources of emissions.
A.

Theory

Absent administrative, enforcement, and political costs, an ideal tax
system would include all activities that produce climate externalities. This
includes emissions of all GHGs from any activity, including not only energy
usage but also agriculture, forestry, and industrial emissions. Moreover, absent administrative costs, the tax would include not only emissions of gases
but also any climate forcing (i.e., any activity that causes a change in the
climate), such as changes to albedo caused by forestry activities.
There are, however, hundreds of sources of GHGs, most of them very
small contributors. Moreover, many sources of emissions may be hard to
measure and tax. To determine the optimal tax base, the administrative savings of a narrow base must be compared to the efficiency benefits of a broad
base. In particular, the tax base should be set so that the benefit of a small
expansion in the base is equal to the increase in administrative or compliance costs.
One can think of broadening the tax base as adding more potential
sources of abatement, some of which may have marginal abatement costs
lower than those of emitters already included in the tax base. These new
sources create the possibility of a lower aggregate cost to achieve any given
aggregate amount of abatement. In Figure 2 below, the steeper marginal
abatement cost curve reflects a narrow tax base. Broadening the base rotates
the curve to the right, and optimal abatement increases from AN to AB given
the marginal benefit of abatement curve MB. The marginal benefit from
broadening the tax base is equal to triangle Oab in the figure. 9'
To determine whether it is desirable to add any particular item to the tax
base, it is necessary to know the marginal abatement costs for the activity
generating the emissions and the costs of administering a tax on the item. In
our discussion below, we use the estimates of the marginal abatement costs
produced by EPA in 2006.92 We do not have data on the administrative costs
of including various items in the tax base; we make judgments based on
information about the relevant activity, but better data might lead to a revision of these judgments. In general, items that offer large opportunities for
9, This analysis abstracts from interactions with other tax distortions. In a second-best
world with pre-existing distortions, lowering the environmental tax rate will have first-order
efficiency gains not reflected in the diagram.
92 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-06-005, GLOBAL MITIGAnON OF NoN-CO 2

GREENHOUSE GASES (2006) [hereinafter GLOBAL MITIGATION], available at http://epa.gov/
climatechange/economics/downloads/GlobalMitigationFullReport.pdf.
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low-cost abatement and low monitoring costs are candidates for inclusion in
the tax base.
There is also a set of complicated political considerations. Adding
items to the tax base increases the number of special interests that will oppose the tax. At the same time, broadening the base allows the tax rate to be
lower overall, thereby possibly reducing opposition from those already in the
base.
A final tax base issue is whether to tax GHGs on the basis of where the
products giving rise to emissions are produced (an origin basis) or where the
products are consumed (a destination basis). This distinction matters where
trade is involved. We defer discussion of this point until Part V, but note
here that we propose a modified origin basis. Under this approach, the
United States would levy a tax at the border on fossil fuel imports from
countries that do not have a substantive carbon pricing system in place. Fossil fuel imports from countries that have a substantial origin-based carbon
pricing system in place would not be subject to a border tax. This principle
would extend to a number of carbon-intensive products, as discussed below.
In neither case would the U.S. carbon tax be rebated on exports. 93
B.

Fossil Fuels

Fossil fuels made up approximately 80% of all U.S. emissions in
2006.9 Most developed countries have a similar profile. Developing countries will tend to have higher emissions from agriculture and deforestation,
9' Maintaining the origin basis principle, it is presumed that other countries with carbon
pricing systems in place would also follow an origin basis principle with respect to the United
States and would therefore not tax imports from the United States that already have a carbon
tax embedded in their price.
9 See EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at ES-7.
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so considerations of how to include those activities in the tax base will be
more important for developing countries.
There are two principles, one physical and one economic, which allow
the collection and enforcement costs for a tax on emissions from fossil fuels
to be relatively low. The first is that a unit of fossil fuel will emit the same
amount of carbon regardless of when or where it is burned. For carbon
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, there is an almost perfect correspondence between input and output. Therefore, it is possible to tax the input the fossil fuel - rather than the output - the emission. The primary exception to this rule is for fossil fuel permanently sequestered, such as fuel used
for tar or carbon that is captured and stored. This issue is discussed in Part
IV.
The second principle is that the incidence of a tax and its efficiency
effects are unrelated to the statutory obligation to remit the tax. This means
that, in deciding where to impose the tax (choosing the remitting entity), one
can focus on minimizing collection and monitoring costs while ensuring
maximum coverage. In general, imposing the tax upstream (i.e., at the earliest point in the production process) will achieve these goals because (1)
there are far fewer upstream producers than there are downstream consumers
and (2) the cost will be lower per unit of tax due to economies of scale in tax
administration.
To illustrate, there are approximately 146 petroleum refineries in the
United States, but there are 247 million registered motor vehicles as well as
millions of users of other petroleum distillates. 95 As a result, imposing the
tax at the refinery level on petroleum products will be far less expensive
than, say, trying to monitor emissions at the tailpipe. Similar principles apply to other fossil fuels. The key is to find a place between extraction and
consumption where it is easiest to tax all or almost all of a fuel.
Arguments for downstream imposition of the tax tend to be based on a
claim that a downstream tax is more visible than an upstream tax and, therefore, a downstream tax will have a greater effect. The claim would be that
consumer response depends on visibility. 96 It is doubtful that this effect
could be very large in the case of a carbon tax for two reasons. First, firms
are likely to advertise the embedded tax in, say, gasoline, so drivers would
be aware that part of the cost of the gasoline is the tax. Second, key energy

ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'r OF EN2008, at I tbl. 1 (2008), available at http:lwww.eia.doe.govlpubl

" The number of operating refineries is from
ERGY, REFINERY CAPACITY

oil gas/petroleum/data-publications/refinery-capacity-data/current/refcap08.pdf. The number
of registered motor vehicles is from FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'r OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY
STATISTICS

2007:

STATE MOTOR-VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS

tbl.MV-1 (2008), availableat http://

www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2007/pdf/mv I .pdf.
9 See generally Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory
and Evidence, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming) (presenting evidence that the salience of a tax
increases the elasticity of demand among consumers); Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience
and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming Aug. 2009) (presenting evidence that the salience
of a tax increases the elasticity of demand among commuters on a toll road).
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consumers - electric utilities and industrial energy users - are unlikely to
be affected by this behavioral phenomenon. 97
1.

Natural Gas

Combustion of natural gas was responsible for 1163 MMT CO2 emissions in the United States in 2006.98 Natural gas is used largely for heating
in the industrial and residential sectors and for producing electric power. 99 It
is the most carbon-efficient fossil fuel in the sense that it produces the largest amount of energy for a given quantity of CO2 emitted.
Natural gas is produced in a variety of circumstances. Most natural gas
comes from stand-alone gas wells, but some is associated with oil production. 00 An additional source (about 9% of the U.S. total as of 2004) is releases from coal beds.' 0' There were almost 450,000 natural gas wells in the
United States in 2007,102 but these are operated by a relatively small number
of operators. According to the Energy Information Administration, the top
500 operators had about 95% of the proved reserves and more than 93% of
production in 2006.103
Most natural gas is "wet" when extracted and must be processed to
remove water vapor, thereby creating "dry" gas that can be put into the
pipeline system. There are 530 large natural gas processors in the lower
forty-eight states, and these process a substantial majority of the natural gas
9 None of the existing carbon pricing schemes is imposed upstream. Instead, they tend to
be imposed midstream on large industrial point sources of emissions, such as power plants and
industrial users of fuel. For example, the EU emissions trading regime is imposed midstream.
One possible reason for this approach may have been to exclude the transportation sector,
since it was already subject to high taxes on motor fuels. An upstream tax would have a
harder time excluding transportation, so the compromise was a more expensive downstream
tax. A related issue is the allocation of free permits. If there are short-term price rigidities such as through electricity price regulation - it may matter which entities receive the free
allocation. See ANTHONY PAUL, DALLAS BURTRAW & KAREN PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS UNDER A U.S. CO 2 EMISSIONS CAP (2008), availableat http://www.
rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-25.pdf. Midstream allocation of the permits may allow
politicians to buy off potentially blocking interests.
98 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 28, at 344 fig.12.3. This figure represents CO2 emissions from combustion of natural gas and excludes emissions of unburned natural gas (methane) into the atmosphere.
99 See id. at 181 diagram 3.
00 For a summary of natural gas production data, see Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Energy, U.S. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production (Apr. 2, 2009), http://tonto.
eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng-prod-sum-dcu NUSa.htm (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review).
101 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0216, U.S. CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS RESERVES: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2007), available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oi-gas/natural-gas/data-publications/crude-oil-natural-gasreserves/historical/2006/pdf/arr.pdf.
'2o Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Number of Producing Gas Wells (Apr. 2,
2009), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ngng-prod-wells-sl-a.htm (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review)

"03Authors' calculations based on

ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,

supra note 101, at A-4 tbl.A2,

A-5 tbl.A3.
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used. Some natural gas, however, is processed close to the point of extraction in smaller "skid" processors. Other natural gas, mostly coal-bed methane as well as gas from some wells that produce relatively dry gas, enters the
pipeline system without substantial processing. 1°4 Once processed, natural
gas enters into the pipeline system and is delivered to the local distribution
companies. Virtually all gas goes through the pipeline system. Not all gas
goes to a local distribution company, however, as some large-volume consumers buy directly from the transmission pipelines.
Most natural gas used in the United States is produced domestically,
but some is imported from Canada through pipelines and from other places
through liquefied natural gas facilities. Currently there are only fifty-five
locations where natural gas (or liquefied natural gas) can be imported or
exported, consisting of six liquefied natural gas facilities and forty-nine
pipeline border points. 105 All these facilities and entry points are regulated
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 1 6
The collection point for the tax on natural gas needs to minimize administrative costs while maximizing coverage. The two most likely places
to do this are at the operator level or at the processing plant (plus imports
and coal-bed methane). Operators already pay state severance taxes, which
means that they have the administrative capacity to pay the tax and that
states are already collecting the necessary data. Although there are many
small operators, taxing the top 500 would capture almost all the natural gas
produced in the United States. 07 If the tax is levied on the processor, small
operators would no longer be able to avoid the tax, and the tax system would
not need to address the problem of different wells producing natural gas of
differing carbon content (i.e., differing amounts of contaminants). The problem with taxing the processor is that some natural gas is put into the pipeline
system without processing. Either choice may be sensible.

'0' See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATURAL GAS PROCESSING: THE
CRUCIAL LINK BETWEEN NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND ITS TRANSPORTATION TO MARKET 3
(2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/natural-gas/feature-articles/2006/ng
process/ngprocess.pdf.
10SSee ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ABOUT U.S. NATURAL GAS PIPETRANSPORTING NATURAL GAS 64 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/publ
LINES oil-gas/natural-gasanalysis-publications/ngpipeline/fullversion.pdf.
"rSee 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2006).
107 See JOEL BLUESTEIN, COVERAGE OF NATURAL GAS EMISSIONS AND FLOWS UNDER A
GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE

PROGRAM

16-17 (2008), available at http://www.pew

climate.org/docUploads/NaturalGasPointofRegulation09.pdf (estimating that 70% of emissions from the natural gas sector are brought into a carbon pricing system if processors and
importers are the point of regulation). We add major producers who add gas directly to the
pipeline network without going through a processing plant. Broader emissions coverage can
be obtained at the producer level (gas wells) or at the level of large users and local distribution
companies, but at the cost of dramatically increasing the number of covered entities. See id. at
21 tbl.5.
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Coal

Coal can be taxed at the production level (mines and import points) or
at the consumption level (electric utilities and industry). We recommend the
former. There were 1438 operating mines in the United States in 2006.108
Almost all coal used in the United States is produced here, and there are very
few exports. °9 Taxing at the mine would capture virtually 100% of U.S.
coal production. Moreover, as noted, coal mines are potential sources of
methane or natural gas, either captured and put into the pipeline system or

released into the air. If it is captured, this source of natural gas may not need
to be processed. Therefore, having mines as taxpayers may create synergy
- they can pay the tax on this source of natural gas as well. If it is not
captured, coal mines should pay a tax on any release. Coal-bed methane
emissions in 2006 were around 58.5 MMT CO 2e,"10 so imposing this tax will
be important.
An alternative is to tax coal downstream. Almost 93% of coal is used
in electricity generation, and nearly all the rest is used by industry. There
are 1470 coal-fueled electric generating units in the United States,"' so taxing the power plants would not be more difficult than taxing at the mine and
would have only a slightly smaller base. Taxing at the utility, however,
would mean losing the synergy created by taxing at the mine discussed
above.1 2 As there does not appear to be any advantage to taxing at the
utility and some disadvantage, taxing at the mine seems to be preferable." 3
In the United States, coal is sorted into four types: anthracite, bituminous, subbituminous, and lignite. Each of these grades has a different carENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOEIEIA-0584, ANNUAL COAL RE2006, at 12 tbl.l (2007), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/coa/O5842006.

'08

PORT

pdf.

I., ENERGY INFO.

ADMIN.,

supra note 28, at 215 tbl.7.7.

110EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 3-36.
...
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0348, ELECTRIC POWER AN-

2007, at 25 tbl.2.2 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.
pdf. The number of power plants with coal-fueled units is smaller because many power plants
have multiple generating units.
112 It also increases the administrative burden for power plants that are dual-fired (burning
coal and natural gas). Plants burning coal would be required to file taxes while plants burning
only gas would not.
113If a large percentage of utilities are eventually in the tax system because of credits for
CCS activities, there may be little difference in the number of taxpayers. Mines will be taxpayers because of coal-bed methane, and coal-burning utilities will be taxpayers because of
CCS. Moreover, unless CCS credits were refundable or tradable, having utilities as taxpayers
would reduce problems with unusable credits. On the other hand, CCS does not right now
exist in the United States and it is not clear how long it will be before it is in widespread use.
See Keith Johnson, FutureGen Fiasco: Killing Illinois Plant Set Clean Coal Back 10 Years,
Congress Says, Wall Street Journal Environmental Capital Blog, Mar. 11, 2009, http:/fblogs.
wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2009/03/l 1/futuregen-fiasco-killing-illinois-plant-set-cleancoal-back-10-years-congress-says (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
Taxing utilities may also be more complex because some plants can use more than one type of
fuel, so the tax would have to vary depending on the fuel being used. In addition, taxing
utilities would require industrial users of coal to be subject to tax separately, a step that is not
necessary if the mines are taxed.
NUAL

HeinOnline -- 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 526 2009

2009]

Metcalf & Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax

527

bon content and, therefore, would need to face a different tax rate." 4 If the
carbon content within any one of the U.S. grades is relatively uniform, there
would be little reason to consider a more fine-grained approach. If, however, there is significant variation within a grade, finer gradations may be
worth considering. Existing cap-and-trade bills in Congress generally delegate this decision to the relevant agency, and a similar delegation would
probably be sensible for a carbon tax.
3.

Petroleum

The two potential places to tax petroleum products are at the source (the
well or import point) or at the refinery. Taxing petroleum downstream is
impractical - there are over two hundred million cars plus many users of
distillates other than gasoline. There were only 146 operating refineries in
the United States in 2008,"1 making the refineries a logical place to impose
the tax. The advantage of taxing refineries is that they could pay a separate
tax on each distillate depending on the carbon content. Distillates, such as
tar, that would not be burned would not be subject to tax. Imports of crude
oil from countries with no carbon pricing system would be subject to the tax
at the refinery without any special provision. Imports of refined products
(about 3.5 million barrels per day), however, would need
to be taxed if they
16
are from a country without a carbon pricing system."
Refineries often engage in inventory exchanges with other refineries.
Although the sale of inventory would normally be the event that triggers the
carbon tax, inventory exchanges should not be taxed because doing so would
cascade the tax: the inventory would be taxed when refinery 1 exchanges it
with refinery 2 and once again when refinery 2 sells it into the market.
4.

Other Issues with the Taxation of Fossil Fuels

We approached carbon emissions from fossil fuels by looking at each
fuel. It is worth pausing to look at whether the structure of particular industries will affect how the tax works. We examine here regulated power and
transportation (road, air, and sea). In Part IV, we examine permanently sequestered carbon.
The most important issue with respect to the regulated power industry
is to ensure that the tax is included in the operating cost component of rates
so that it is passed on to customers. If it is not, users will not see the approI" Estimated carbon dioxide emission factors for the various grades are 103.6, 93.5, 97.1,
and 96.4 kg CO 2 per MMBtu for anthracite, bituminous, subbituminous, and lignite, respectively. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 20.
15 See ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., supra note 95, at I tbl.1.
116An advantage of taxing at the refinery is that we would be setting rates for refined
products that could then be used for taxing imports of refined products. Note that we need to
ensure that any fuel used by refineries would be taxed under this system. That is, we have to
ensure the tax on refined products is not only on the sale of refined products but also on the
refinery's own use of any petroleum.
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priate price, defeating part of the reason for the tax." 7 This should not be an
issue with a tax on the fuel purchased by the utility: if the tax is imposed
upstream, it would simply be embedded in the price and naturally flow into
electricity rates through fuel costs. This presumes that state regulators allow
utilities to pass fuel cost increases through to consumers. It is not obvious
that this will always occur. Regulatory reluctance to flow permit costs
through will likely be higher for a cap-and-trade system where permits are
given away; there is an opportunity cost to using a permit even if received
for free, but it is very unlikely that a regulator will allow a utility to charge
customers a non-zero opportunity cost related to use of a permit that the
utility received for free.' 8 Similar issues may arise with respect to tax credits intended to act similarly to freely allocated permits.19
The major issue with respect to road transportation is the interaction
with existing tax and regulatory regimes. There are gas taxes under current
law as well as regulatory regimes designed to alter gasoline usage. 20 The
question is whether the carbon tax is additional to these regimes or replaces
some or all of them.
There are numerous non-carbon externalities from driving, including
accidents, congestion, and non-carbon pollution. The optimal gas tax has
been estimated to be roughly twice as high as the current U.S. tax.' 2 ' The
most important source of externalities from driving is congestion; carbon
emissions are a relatively small element. Therefore, the imposition of a tax
on petroleum, and hence gasoline, to internalize externalities from carbon
emissions should not result in a reduction in the existing gasoline tax.
The appropriate treatment of emissions from international aviation and
maritime fuels (known as bunker fuels) is part of the larger issue of carbon
leakage and optimal border tax treatment. We discuss this in greater detail
below, but we make some preliminary comments here. Taxing emissions
from aviation on purely domestic flights would be straightforward - jet fuel
would be taxed at the refinery. There are, however, two problems with taxing emissions from international aviation. The first is that there is an existing treaty under the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO")

117Investors would see the effect, however, potentially leading to beneficial diversion of

investment into low carbon technology.
"' Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Consumer Burden of a
Cap-and-Trade System with Freely Allocated Permits 2 (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 144, 2008), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081223ConsumerBurden.pdf (discussing the distributional implications of different regulatory treatment of freely allocated versus auctioned permits).
"9 For a history of and rationale for electricity industry deregulation and discussion of
differences between the regulated and deregulated systems, see Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring,
Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector, J. EcON. PERSP., Summer
1997, at 119.
120See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 228-233.
121Ian W.H. Parry & Kenneth A. Small, Does Britain or the United States Have the Right
Gasoline Tax?, 95 Am. ECON. REv. 1276, 1277 (2005).
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22
that prohibits imposing taxes on fuel carried on international services.
Second, because of the possibility of fueling or refueling in countries without a tax, carbon leakage could be a significant problem.'23 Moreover, taxing fuel at the refinery may not be feasible if, at the time of taxation, it is
unknown whether the fuel will be used for international or domestic flights.
There are two primary options. First, the United States could impose a
tax on international aviation by making several adjustments. The ICAO
treaty could be renegotiated (or the United States could simply breach it). In
addition, to prevent carbon leakage, the United States could impose a
surcharge for any fuel taken on in a non-taxing country for flights with a
U.S. destination. The second alternative is to forgo taxing fuel used in international aviation. Airlines would get a credit for fuel used in international
flights much like the crediting system for CCS. The problem with this alternative is that it would leave out a significant source of emissions - international aviation
emissions worldwide are nearly double domestic aviation
24
emissions.
The economic issues are similar for bunker fuels in shipping. While
there is no treaty preventing the taxation of bunker fuels in ships, the problem of carbon leakage is serious - ships would have incentives to refuel in
locations where there is no tax. Moreover, it might be more complicated to
track fuel use on ships than on aircraft, making it more difficult to impose a
surcharge for such refueling.

C.

Other Sources of Emissions

In addition to emissions from fossil fuel combustion, GHG emissions
include (1) non-combustion CO 2 emissions; (2) non-CO 2 GHG emissions,
including emissions of methane and N20 from agriculture; and (3) emissions
from forestry and land use activities. We discuss below the extent to which
these sources should be included in the tax base. The EPA data on marginal
abatement costs allows us to estimate the benefits of including various
sources in the tax base, but there is no data on the administrative costs of
doing so. Therefore, the judgments below are necessarily preliminary, and
greater study of most of these sources of emissions is warranted.
1. Non-Combustion CO2 Emissions
Non-combustion carbon dioxide emissions accounted for less than 4%
of C0 2 emissions in 2006.125 Cement manufacturing and steel and iron pro,22Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 24,
Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (9th ed., ICAO Doc. 7300/9, 2006).
,23Carbon leakage is discussed more extensively in the context of border tax adjustments
in Part V.B.2, infra.
124 STERN, supra note 40, at 549.
125 Authors' calculations based on EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 2-4 tbl.2-l.
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duction accounted for approximately half the emissions in this category. 2 6 It
may be reasonable to include their emissions (as well as emissions from a
few other industries in this category) in the tax base.
Cement manufacturing produced about 45.7 MMT CO 2 in 2006 sepa27
rate from the emissions associated with energy used during production.
The emissions stem from the production of clinker, an intermediate product,
which is a combination of lime and silica-containing materials. 28 According
to EPA, CO 2 emissions from production are directly proportional to the lime
content of the clinker. 29 The tax would be imposed at the source of clinker
production. There are 116 cement plants in the United States; as of 2005,
they were owned by thirty-nine companies. 30 These are large, stationary
sources of emissions and, therefore, should be relatively easy to tax.
Steel and iron production produced 49.1 MMT CO 2 in 2006. 11 The
emissions, separate from the emissions associated with the energy used to
produce iron and steel, come from the production of metallurgical coke, pig
iron, and steel itself. 3 2 The emissions can be measured indirectly by the
amount of coke, pig iron, and steel production. The tax can be applied at the
point of production. There are only twenty-three steel mills in the United
States.'33 Therefore, like cement manufacturing, steel and iron production
should be relatively easy to include in the tax base.
2.

Other Greenhouse Gas Emissions

In addition to carbon dioxide, a number of other gases contribute to
global warming. Gases other than carbon dioxide account for 15% of total
U.S. emissions. 3 4 Methane is the most important, followed by nitrous oxide,
fluorinated gases and sulfur hexafluoride. 133 While non-CO2 emissions are
not a large share of total emissions, studies suggest that they will provide a
relatively low-cost source of emission reductions under a carbon tax or other
form of carbon pricing. One study, for example, estimates that about one'

26

See id.

127 Id.

at 4-3 tbl.4-1.

128Id. at 4-5.
29
1 Id.
130 Portland Cement Ass'n, Cement Industry Overview (May 2008), http://www.cement.
org/econ/industry.asp (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review); Portland Cement
Ass'n, Overview of the Cement Industry (May 2003), http://www.cement.org/basics/cement
industry.asp (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). For more detail on the
industry, see LISA J. HANLE, KAMALA R. JAYARAMAN & JOSHUA S. SMITH, CO 2 EMISSIONS
PROFILE OF THE U.S. CEMENT INDUSTRY (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/
conference/ei 13/ghg/hanle.pdf.
131 EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 2-4 tbl.2-1.
132 Id. at 4-34.
'33 Energy International, Metals Advisor - Iron and Steel Overview: Integrated Mill Business Structure, http://www.energysolutionscenter.orgHeatTreat/MetasAdvisor/iron and_
steel/overview/integrated millbusinessstructure.htm (last visited March 15, 2009) (on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
34 See EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 2-4 tbl.2-1.
135
Id.
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third of the initial emission reductions from carbon pricing would come from
36
reductions in non-CO 2 emissions.
a. Methane
Five sources account for about 85% of all methane emissions in the
United States. These are enteric fermentation (126.2 MMT CO2e), landfills
(125.7 MMT), natural gas systems (102.4 MMT), coal mining (58.5 MMT),
and manure management (41.4 MMT). 137
Enteric fermentation is a part of the digestive process in ruminants (in
the United States, largely cattle), which produces methane. The feed quality
and feed intake affect emissions. 3 8 The U.S. inventory system measures
emissions from enteric fermentation through detailed calculations that separate cattle by region, age, reproductive status, and industry segment. 3 9 The
system uses estimates of the digestible energy and methane conversion rates
from various diets to determine emissions from the various categories. 40
EPA estimates the marginal abatement costs for methane from enteric
fermentation. For the United States, it estimates that emissions in 2010
could be reduced by 6.4% at zero cost and 21.4% at $45 per ton of CO2e.14 1
These are reasonably large reductions for the cost. As a result, the United
States might consider levying a head tax on cattle based on average emissions for a small number of cattle types. Since modifications to diet can
reduce emissions, taxpayers should be allowed a reduced rate when they
provide proof that they are using approved diets that reduce emissions.
According to the EPA Inventory, roughly 1800 operating landfills exist
in the United States. 42 Municipal landfills account for nearly 90% of methane landfill emissions, with industrial landfills making up the rest. 143 Methane recovery has grown over time since 1996 federal regulations required
large landfills to capture and combust landfill methane' 44 (thereby converting
it to less potent CO 2). Whereas only 20% of landfill methane was burned for
energy, flared, or oxidized in 1990, over half of methane emissions were in
2006.14 EPA estimates that with a tax of forty-five dollars per ton, more
than 80% of U.S. landfill emissions could be eliminated. 46 Requiring monitoring of all landfills and including their emissions in the tax base should be
relatively straightforward.

36

1

SERGEY PALTSEV ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE PROPOSALS

available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC-Rpt146.pdf.
137 EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at ES-5 tbl.ES-2.
138 Id. at 6-2.
139 Id. at 6-3 to 6-4.
' See id.
141GLOBAL MITIGATION, supra note ,92, at V-49 tbl.I-18.
4' EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 8-2.
143Id.
'"See id. at 8-3.
'45 See id. at 8-3 tbl.8-3.
GLOBAL MITIGATION, supra note 92, at III-10 tbl. 1-6.
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Methane emissions from natural gas systems arise in field production
(27%), processing (12%), transmission and storage (37%), and distribution
(24%). 141 So-called "direct inspection and maintenance" can significantly
reduce these emissions. 14 Despite the growth in natural gas consumption
between 1990 and 2006, emissions in the processing, transmission and storage, and distribution stages fell by approximately 20%. 141 Implementing the
carbon tax on processors based on inputs will ensure that some of these
emissions are brought into the carbon tax base and thereby provide the appropriate incentives to implement improvements to reduce accidental releases. In addition, it might be possible to add transmission, storage, and
distribution systems to the tax base by monitoring inputs and outputs and
imposing taxes on any natural gas that is unaccounted for. If such a system
is feasible, about three-quarters of methane emissions from natural gas
would be included in the tax base.
Bringing field production emissions into the tax system is probably not
realistic. Instead, mandates for certain processes or technologies may be
useful here. The rising price of natural gas over time will also provide an
incentive to reduce emissions (as they reflect natural gas that cannot be
sold).
Methane emissions from other sources can be considered for inclusion
in the tax base on a case-by-case basis. Emissions from coal mines are easily monitored and collected in some (but not all) cases. Nearly two-thirds of
these emissions come from underground mines 5 ° where methane is removed
through ventilation systems for safety reasons and so can be collected, measured, and made subject to the tax. 5' Emissions from surface mines, on the
other hand, are more difficult to capture since they are released as the overburden is removed. Surface mine emissions are much lower in amount,
however.'52 EPA estimates that almost 86% of methane emissions from coal
mining can be eliminated at fifteen dollars per ton, making coal-bed methane
a good target for inclusion in the tax base.'53
b.

Nitrous Oxide

Nitrous oxide ("N 20") has a 100-year GWP of 310. About threequarters of the 368 MMT CO 2e of annual U.S. N 20 emissions come from
agricultural management activities.' l These emissions are a prime example
'47Shares of emissions from EPA

INVENTORY,

supra note 12, at 3-43 tbl.3-34.

148GLOBAL MITIGATION, supra note 92, at 11-16.
149EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 3-43 tbl.3-34.

150Id. at 3-36 tbl.3-27.
"I'Prior to 2002, coal-bed methane was eligible for the section 29 non-conventional fuels
tax credit of three dollars per barrel of oil equivalent. See Curtis Carlson & Gilbert E. Metcalf,
Energy Tax Incentives and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 61 NAT'L TAX J. 477, 480 (2008).
The credit could be reinstated or methane flaring could be allowed as an offset activity to
provide a financial incentive to capture these emissions.
112GLOBAL MMGATION, supra note 92, at 11-2, 11-3.
53
1 Id. at 11-10 tbl.l-8.
154 EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 2-5 tbl.2-1, 6-1 tbl.6-1.
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of a case where there are large emissions (almost 4% of the U.S. total) but
where it will be difficult to include them in the tax base. The reason is that
the emissions stem from a wide variety of sources that are difficult to observe. "'5 The particular extent of emissions depends on the precise nature
and location of the activity, making it difficult to set tax rates. A full exploration of emissions from agricultural soil management would need a separate
study. We make only a few initial observations here.
N 2 0 is produced naturally in soils through nitrification and denitrification. Various agricultural activities increase mineral nitrogen availability in
soils, increasing the amount of N20 emitted. These include application of
synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, organic amendments to soil (such as manure,
compost, and sludge), urine and dung from grazing animals, and crop residues. 5 6 Various soil management activities, such as irrigation, drainage, tillage, and fallowing of land influence nitrogen mineralization.,57
The precise emissions from any given activity depend on many factors.
For example, the granularity of the soil affects the process of denitrification. 58 This means that the tax rate can only be correct on average. Actual
emissions from any particular activity cannot be measured. Instead, a tax
would have to rely on rough proxies, such as the total amount of fertilizer
applied or the total number of livestock grazing during the year. It is worth
noting, however, that EPA estimates that roughly 20% of N20 emissions
arise from the use of artificial fertilizers. 119 A fertilizer tax would likely lead
to less fertilizer use but could lead to other practices that release nitrogen.
For example, if fertilizer is taxed but manure is not, there would be incentives to substitute manure for fertilizer (thereby increasing the value of a
livestock byproduct and consequently making livestock relatively less costly
to raise), and it is possible that emissions from livestock could increase as a
result.
The second largest source of N20 is mobile combustion emissions (33.1
MMT). 60 Mandating annual vehicle emissions tests would provide a way to
include these in the tax base.' 6' The remaining N20 emissions can be added
to the tax base on a case-by-case basis.

5 See id. at 6-17 to 6-31.
56 Id.at 6-18 fig.6-2 (providing a picture of agricultural sources of nitrogen that result in
N20 157
emissions).
See id. at 6-17.
58

id. at 6-19.
id. at 6-19 tbl.6-15.
160Id. at 3-30 tbl.3-22.
1

59
'

161 Annual emissions are the product of emissions per gallon gasoline, miles per gallon,
and annual miles driven. The first and third components of this can be measured at the inspection (assuming mileage records are kept as part of the inspection). Assumptions about fuel
efficiency can be built into the tax based on year and model of the vehicle.
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Fluorinated Gases and Sulfur Hexafluoride

There are a large number of man-made gases with high GWPs (generically, fluorinated gases) used throughout the economy. 62 Chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") and related chemicals were in wide use prior to the
Montreal Protocol but were banned because of their effect on ozone.
Hydrofluorocarbons ("HFCs") were developed as alternatives to these
ozone-depleting substances for industrial, commercial, and consumer products. The GWPs of these gases range from around 140 (HFC-152a) to
11,700 (HFC-23). 163 They have varying atmospheric lives, with some very
short and some ranging up to tens of thousands of years. If treated as a
single category, they make up about 125 MMT CO 2 e emissions in the
United States each year.1 64 This would make them one of the top five
sources of emissions.
Because they have very high GWPs, the tax on these chemicals will be
many times the market price. The price signal from taxation, therefore, may
be very important for these chemicals. Nevertheless, they may not be easy
to tax through a direct mechanism. The reason is that emissions from
fluorinated gases are largely fugitive emissions, gases that inadvertently escape through leakage or inappropriate disposal. This means that there is no
observable transaction on which to base the tax. For example, a significant
source of HFCs is leakage from air conditioning for cars and trucks. Similarly, certain types of foam contain significant HFCs and improper disposal
can lead to the eventual release of the gases.' 65
A promising method of taxing emissions of these gases is a depositrefund system. In a deposit-refund system, an initial presumptive tax is levied on the manufacture or purchase of an item and a refund is provided upon
proof of proper disposal. To illustrate, consider an automobile with an air
conditioner that uses HFCs. Imagine that it uses an amount that if emitted to
the atmosphere would trigger a tax of $1000. Any HFCs that have not
leaked out of the car can be recovered upon scrapping of the car and reused,
thereby avoiding any release to the atmosphere. Rather than try to tax the
leakage, the United States can impose a tax of $1000 per unit purchased and
refund the tax for all HFCs that are recycled upon retirement of the automobile. Even though disposition of the automobile may not be easily moni-

162 Information

for this section of the paper comes from INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON

CLIMATE CHANGE, SAFEGUARDING THE OZONE LAYER AND THE GLOBAL CLIMATE SYSTEM:

ISSUES RELATED TO HYDROFLUOROCARBONS AND PERFLUOROCARBONS (2005) [hereinafter
SAFEGUARDING THE OZONE LAYER], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/sroc/

sroc-full.pdf.
163The GWPs of these gases are very sensitive to the period of measurement as they have
a wide range of atmospheric lifetimes. For a complete list of these chemicals and their GWPs
over various periods, see Solomon et al., supra note 1, at 33 tbl.TS.2.
164 EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 4-3 tbl.4-1.
165 Id. at 4-54.
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tored, an incentive exists to capture and recycle the HFCs. The tax is then
166
paid only on the HFCs that have leaked out of the car over its lifetime.
A deposit-refund system potentially works in the fluorinated gas context because there are relatively few manufacturers, making collection of the
upfront tax easy. For example, there are only five producers of HFCs in the
United States right now. 67 In addition, in many places, there are well-developed recycling, reuse, or disposal requirements for these chemicals at the
state and local level, which means that tracking disposal would not be expensive. In addition, given the refund upon proper disposal, there would be
an incentive to reveal information about disposal to be eligible for refunds.
For example, when a vehicle is junked, there would be an incentive to remove the air conditioning system with the HFCs intact to obtain the refund.
A deposit-refund system faces many of the same design issues as does a
tax. For example, imports would have to be carefully monitored and taxed.
If the gases can be imported without tax, businesses could earn profits by
manufacturing the chemicals abroad for the sole reason of obtaining the refund in the United States. Since most HFCs are used in refrigeration and air
conditioners, imposing a tax on imports should not be overly difficult.
In a related vein, some of these gases are used in the production of
other goods, such as the use of perfluorocarbons in semiconductor manufacturing.'68 Unless imports of goods manufactured with these chemicals are
subject to tax, taxing domestic production would create an incentive to shift
production abroad, particularly because the tax would be many times the
cost of the chemical (due to the high GWP). 'However, an accurate tax on
imports might be difficult to assess because emissions from manufacturing
abroad would not be observable. Therefore, depending on how easy it is to
shift manufacturing using these gases abroad, a lower tax rate may be appropriate. This is simply another example of the border tax problem that we
discuss in Part V.
A major source of emissions of fluorinated gases comes from existing
banks of these gases rather than new production. According to the IPCC,
there are almost twenty-one billion metric tons (21,000 MMT) CO 2e in
banked fluorinated gases.169 Because of the Montreal Protocol,'70 production
of CFCs has ceased in the developed world.' 7' Nevertheless, emissions from
CFCs continue because they remain in existing refrigeration and other systems. 7 2 Banked gases will not have been subject to the tax on production, so
66 Deposit-refund systems are discussed extensively in Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton,
The Two-Part Instrument in a Second-Best World, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1961 (2005). It might be
necessary to create tightness quality standards for automobile air conditioners since it is difficult for the consumer to monitor the quality of the air conditioner.
167 SAFEGUARDING THE OZONE LAYER, supra note 162, at 407 fig.l 1.1.
"68EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at ES-6 tbl.ES-2.
169 SAFEGUARDING THE OZONE LAYER, supra note 162, at 9.
170Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29.
171EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at ES-2.
172 Id. at 4-52.
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the question is whether they should be subject to the refund on proper disposal. Our view is that they should: the refund on proper disposal creates an
incentive not to emit these gases. Given the size of existing banks, proper
disposal is important. This is analogous to an offset provision for GHG
emissions that are not included in the tax base.
Finally, sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) is a potent GHG. It is used in electrical transmission and distribution equipment with most emissions arising
from leakage. 7 3 SF6 has a 100-year GWP of 23,900, so a $25 per ton CO2 e
carbon tax would be equal to $597,500 per ton of SF 6. 7 4 Therefore, even a
modest carbon tax may have a large effect on the use of this chemical.
Emissions of SF6 fell by nearly 50% between 1990 and 2006, reflecting the
higher price of the product. 75 A deposit-refund mechanism here would be a
relatively simple way to bring this gas into the carbon tax base.
3.

Forestry and Land Use Activities

Forestry and land use serves as a net sink, removing some 900 MMT
CO 2e from the atmosphere in 2006.176 Changes in land and forest use can
add or remove carbon on balance. Adding these activities to the tax base
would require establishing a baseline. To see the complexity of this, consider a forest that currently sequesters 100 tons of CO2 per year. Should an
owner of that property receive a tax credit for the 100 tons of sequestered
C0 2 ? Or perhaps the owner should be subjected to a tax on fifty tons of CO 2
because an "undisturbed" forest would sequester 150 tons of CO 2? One
way to proceed would be to set as a baseline the emissions/sequestration as
of the first year of the carbon tax. But if the tax is anticipated, it creates an
incentive to cut down the forest prior to the first year of the tax so as to
obtain large amounts of credits in early
years, since young forests absorb
177
more carbon than do mature forests.
Once a baseline is set, a forestry carbon assessment could be undertaken periodically (e.g., every ten years) and the tax applied retrospectively.
Continuing with the example above, assume the forest in question is an immature forest and over a ten-year period sequestration falls to eighty tons per
year. With 100 tons per year established as the baseline, the annual emissions would be estimated to rise from zero tons in year0 to twenty tons in
year 0 . The retrospective tax would be equal to two tons in year, times the
year, tax rate plus four tons in year2 times the year2 tax rate and so on to
year 0 when the tax is twenty tons times the year 0 tax rate. Landowners

73

Id. at 4-61.
Id. at 1-7 tbl.1-2.
'75Id. at 4-61.
1

74

1

at 7-2 tbl.7-1.
The anticipation problem might be avoided by setting a past year as the baseline year

176Id.
'17

for allocation of permits.
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payments over the decade in anticipacould be required to make estimated
78
tion of the retrospective liability.
One can imagine any number of complications with such a system. It
may be preferable to leave forestry and land use out of the tax system but
provide the opportunity for owners of such resources to opt in through offsets. 17 9 This might be limited to major landowners to limit administrative
costs. Considering forest ownership, the United States might limit offsets to
the major paper and forest product companies and require that they consider
offsets on their entire stock of land rather than individual parcels. This
reduces problems of non-additional projects (projects that would be undertaken regardless of whether there is a carbon tax).
4.

Summary

We offer here a brief survey of non-fossil fuel combustion emissions.
Determining the full extent of the tax base for these emissions would require
a more detailed examination of each item. Based on the analysis above,
however, it seems likely that the United States could include in the tax base
somewhere around half of the emissions from sources other than fossil fuel
combustion at a reasonable cost. In particular, if emissions from landfills,
enteric fermentation, substitutes for ozone depleting chemicals, natural gas
systems, coal mining, and steel and cement production were included in the
base, plus possibly some fraction of nitrous oxide emissions from mobile
sources, it would be possible to reach about half of the non-fossil fuel combustion emissions. There might, moreover, be additional room for expanding tax base beyond these categories.
IV.

CARBON SEQUESTRATION CREDITS

We have noted above in several places the need to provide credits for

activities that permanently sequester carbon. Carbon capture and storage
("CCS"), for example, is a much discussed technology to capture CO 2 emissions from coal combustion in electricity generators. The CO 2 is compressed, liquefied, and transported to a geologically desirable location where
it is permanently stored underground. The technology for CCS is well unis injected underground now as part of enhanced oil recovderstood and CO
80 2
ery methods.
"'See John M. Reilly & Malcolm 0. Asadoorian, Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Land Use: CreatingIncentives within Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems,
80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 173, 187-188 (2007); Gilbert E. Metcalf & John M. Reilly, Policy Options for Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Implicationsfor Agriculture, CHOICES, 1st
Quarter 2008, at 34.
"I Such an offset system would work similarly to the CDM, i.e., by establishing a baseline rate of deforestation and providing credits for improvements from that baseline.
OThe Weybum-Midale fields in Saskatchewan, Canada, are oil fields where CO 2 is used
for enhanced oil recovery on a large scale. Petroleum Tech. Research Ctr., Weyburn-Midale
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While it is clear that CCS works in single applications, little is known
about the potential to scale the technology up to levels that will be required
given our current and projected coal consumption. No existing projects are
associated with coal production,'

as the United States faces many obstacles

in developing a major CCS program for coal, such as finding adequate and
safe storage sites for large volumes of carbon dioxide and developing a pipeline system for transporting it."'2 One study has estimated that a price in the

neighborhood of thirty dollars per ton of CO 2 begins to make CCS economically viable, assuming that the various technical, regulatory, financial, and
political obstacles can be overcome.

83

Regardless of the feasibility of CCS, the carbon tax will only provide
an incentive for sequestration if the tax base excludes fossil fuel use for
which emissions are captured and stored. This can be done either by explicitly excluding such fuels (and other gases for which sequestration occurs)
from the tax base or by levying the tax and providing a credit for approved
sequestration activities. We advocate the latter as being easier to administer.
Credits could be applied against carbon tax liability. Because firms engaging in CCS and other approved sequestration activities may not be the same
firms that pay the carbon tax, we recommend that the credits be made tradable as is effectively done with other tax credits such as the low-income
housing tax credit. Making the credits tradable ensures that their full value

is realized by firms engaging in sequestration activities.'1 4

CO 2 Project: Overview, http://www.ptrc.ca/weybum-overview.php (last visited Mar. 17,
2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). The CO 2 is purchased from the
Dakota Gasification Company synfuels plant in North Dakota and shipped by pipeline to the
Canadian fields. Id. As of 2006, it was sequestering nearly 9000 metric tons of CO2 per day
in the field making it a leading sequestration project in operation today. Petroleum Tech.
Research Ctr., Weyburn-Midale CO 2 Project: History, http://www.ptrc.ca/weybum-history.php
(last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
StatoilHydro has CCS programs in place at several natural gas fields, too. At its Sleipner field,
it captures one MMT CO 2 annually and stores it 800 meters below the seabed. StatoilHydro,
Sleipner Vest, http://www.statoilhydro.com/en/EnvironmentSociety/Sustainability/2007/Envi
ronment/Climate/CarbonCapture/Capture/Pages/SleipnerVest.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009)
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Gas from the Snohvit field is converted to liquefied natural gas and the CO 2 is frozen and removed. StatoilHydro, Snohvit,
http://www.statoilhydro.com/en/EnvironmentSociety/Sustainability/2007/Environment/Cli
mate/CarbonCapture/CapturelPages/Snohvit.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review). The CO 2 is transported back to the field and stored in a
porous sandstone structure below the gas field. Id. A third CCS project in the In Salah gas
field in Algeria captured and reinjected roughly 700,000 metric tons of CO 2 into the gas field
as of 2007. StatoilHydro, In Salah, http://www.statoilhydro.conen/EnvironmentSociety/
Sustainability/2007/Environment/ClimateCarbonCaptureCapture/Pages/nSaah.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
81 See DEUTCH ET AL.,

supra note 72, at 59.

Id. at 56-59.
183 Id. at xi.
182

8 The final incidence of the credits will depend on the relative supply and demand elasticities for these credits. We anticipate that the demand elasticity would be significantly
greater than the supply elasticity so that most of the value of credits will go to firms engaging
in approved sequestration activities.
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Tax credits are also an issue for fossil fuels that are used as feedstocks
or converted into non-fuel end-products such as asphalt, lubricants and
waxes. Table C shows ultimate CO 2 emissions and storage for fossil fuels
applied to these non-fuel uses.
TABLE

Source
Feedstocks
Asphalt
Lubricants
Waxes
Other
Total

C.

2006

CO2 E EMISSIONS AND STORAGE FROM
185
NON-ENERGY FUEL USE

Emissions
(MMT)
82.8
0.0
19.1
0.8
35.3
138.0

Stored
(MMT)
132.4
92.8
1.8
1.1
11.7
239.8

Percentage
Stored
62
100
9
58
25
63

Emissions from non-energy use accounted for 2% of total emissions in
2006.186 Feedstocks are the main source of these emissions. An upstream
carbon tax will incorporate these emission sources in the tax base. The more
salient issue for non-energy fuel use is to ensure that the United States taxes
only emissions and not the carbon that is captured and permanently sequestered. As Table C indicates, the percentage of carbon stored varies widely
across non-energy uses. A simple tax credit works well where all carbon is
captured (as is the case with CCS or the use of fuels in asphalt). For intermediate fuels used as feedstocks, the EPA Inventory assumes that 62% of all
carbon is stored regardless of the feedstock source.'87 Thus, one approach
would allow a credit for fuels sold as feedstocks to receive a partial credit
(62% of one CO 2e ton per credit) with periodic updating of the storage factor
as needed. It may be that providing a credit for asphalt and feedstock use is
sufficient given the small amounts of stored carbon in the other categories.
Tax credits can be combined with a system of offsets for non-covered
activities. As noted above, we see a role for qualified offsets that pass the
additionality test (activities that lead to a net reduction in emissions and
would not have taken place in the absence of the offset funds). The difficulty, of course, is in assessing additionality. Offsets would be provided to
entities that demonstrate to the government's satisfaction that their activities
that fall outside the tax base are reducing GHG emissions. The offsets could
be traded like the tax credits and used to reduce the carbon tax liability. An
open question is whether offsets should be limited to activities within the
185 Authors' calculations using data from EPA INVENTORY, supra note 12, at 3-22 to 3-23,
to 3-15.
tbls.3-13
86
1 Id. at 3-19.
181 Id. at 3-21 to 3-22, 3-23 tbl.3-15.
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United States or available for activities undertaken elsewhere. For example,
offsets might be allowed for projects that satisfy the Kyoto Protocol's Clean
Development Mechanism ("CDM") criteria.'88 The experience with CDMs
is instructive here. Progress has been very slow in certifying and accepting
CDM projects. s9 The certifying of projects occurs on a case-by-case basis. 9 Some have argued for sector-based CDM eligibility.' 91 All the issues
that arise with assessing CDM projects would also arise with domestic offset
programs.
V.

TRADE

Because carbon emissions are a global externality -

emissions any-

where affect everyone - and because of the large volume of trade in fossil
fuels and in goods produced with fossil fuels, carbon taxes must always be
designed with international considerations in mind. In an ideal world, all
countries would impose a harmonized carbon tax so that emissions anywhere in the world faced the same price. Realistically, some major emitting
countries either will refuse to impose any price on carbon at all or will do so
in a narrow or perfunctory way. Even countries that impose carbon pricing
regimes may not harmonize their regimes, 92 creating problems when goods
subject to different tax rates are traded.
There are good arguments that border tax adjustments - taxes on imports to compensate for taxes on domestic production and rebates of such
domestic taxes on exports - are not inconsistent with, and in fact are required by, the principles of free trade. Free trade relies on the principle of
comparative advantage. In a free market, everyone is better off if those who
can produce a good at lowest cost do so. A country without a carbon price
does not have a true comparative advantage in producing carbon-intensive
goods relative to a country with a carbon price; it produces at what looks
like a lower cost only because the nominal price of the good does not include the full costs of production.
The key problem with border tax adjustments for carbon taxes is determining the carbon content of goods that are exported or imported. Border

18 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 12. Of course, projects that are used as offsets
under a U.S. carbon tax should not be allowed as offsets under the EU ETS.
'89 See, e.g., Brian Fallow, Carbon Price Anyone's Guess, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 22, 2007, at
C2.
19oSee Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and
Potential, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1759, 1770 (2008).
'9' See, e.g., Josdluis Samaniego & Christiana Figueres, Evolving to a Sector-Based Clean

Development Mechanism, in BUILDING ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: OPToNs FOR PROTECTING
THE CLIMATE 89 (Kevin A. Baumert et al. eds., 2002), available at http://pdf.wri.org/opc-full.
pdf.

192 See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing the failure of the Scandinavian countries to
harmonize their carbon tax schemes).
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tax adjustments under a VAT are based on the price of the good. Unlike the
price of a good, the carbon content of a good is not readily observable.
So long as the two trading countries both have the same carbon price,
however, border tax adjustments are not necessary. If both trading partners
have the same carbon price, neither would gain an advantage in trade with
the other. Therefore, it is possible to substantially reduce administrative
costs by using an origin-basis system (i.e., no border tax adjustments) for
trade between countries with an adequate carbon price. Imports from countries without an adequate carbon price would, however, most likely need to
be subject to a tax at the border as a substitute for their lack of a carbon
price, and below we discuss ways to administer such a system. Exports to
these countries could be allowed a rebate for carbon taxes paid here. There
may be modest efficiency advantages to allowing a rebate, but the administrative costs could be substantial.
Although a complete analysis of border tax adjustments for carbon
taxes requires a separate paper, we provide a short discussion of the issues
here.
A.

Trade in Carbon-Intensive Goods

Before discussing the economic and legal issues related to border tax
adjustments, it is worth having a sense of the extent of trade in carbonintensive goods and the sources of imports. In the United States, the most
energy-intensive manufacturing industries are petroleum refining, paper,
mineral products (such as lime and cement), chemicals, ferrous metals (iron
and steel), and nonferrous metals (largely aluminum). 9 Border tax adjustments for imports of crude oil for petroleum refining should be relatively
uncontroversial, so the major issues relate to the remaining five industries. 94
These products vary in their exposure to trade. The United States imports more than 40% of its aluminum and copper, but only 13-15% of its
paper. 95 Surprisingly, the United States imports 25% of the cement it consumes, notwithstanding its weight. 9 6 The most energy-intensive goods tend
to be less exposed to trade than non-energy-intensive goods. 197
Although trade discussions often explicitly or implicitly focus on China
because of its increasing share of U.S. imports, China is a relatively small
source of these five carbon-intensive products. Canada is instead the dominant exporter of such goods to the United States. As shown in Table D,

93

1

TREVOR

HOUSER

ET AL., LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD: INTERNATIONAL COM-

8 (2008), availableat http://pdf.wri.org/levelingthescarbon playing..field.pdf.
'1 We focus here on energy-intensive goods. Note, however, that there may be goods that
have high associated CO 2e emissions because they are produced using high GWP gases.
' 5 HOUSER Er AL., supra note 193, at 8.
PETITION AND U.S. CLIMATE POLICY DESIGN

196

id.

"I See id. at 9 fig.1.3.
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China is significant only with respect to cement, and Canada dominates all
categories except for chemical imports, where it is second.
TABLE

I
2
3
4
5

Steel
Source
Canada
EU
Mexico
Brazil
China

D.

U.S. IMPORTS BY ORIGIN, 2005198

Aluminum
% Source %
18.6 Canada 51.0
17.3 Russia 17.1
13.1 EU
6.2
8.2 OPEC
5.1
7.1 Brazil
3.8

Chemicals
Source
%
Trinidad 41.6
Canada 19.3
Ukraine 7.3
OPEC
6.6
EU
4.5

Paper
Source
%
Canada 66.9
EU
16.8
China
3.5
S. Korea 2.2
Mexico
2.2

Cement
Source
%
Canada
16.1
China
14.0
EU
13.9
OPEC
10.0
Thailand 8.6

It is worth making several comments on this table. First, it does not
include finished products such as automobiles. These products may be very
carbon-intensive and their sources may be different than the sources listed
above. Second, the manufacture of many of these items has been shifting
toward developing nations, and the 2005 data presented may not reflect
long-term trends. Finally, as discussed below, even though a large majority
of U.S. imports of carbon-intensive goods originate in developed countries
that are likely to enact or have already enacted carbon pricing regimes, border tax adjustments can still be important because they will have net revenue
effects (unlike the typical case of border tax adjustments under a VAT).
B.
1.

The Effect of Border Tax Adjustments

The Effect of Border Tax Adjustments for a Specific Excise Tax

Border tax adjustments provide a rebate for any taxes paid when a good
is exported and impose a tax when a good is imported. They are standard in
VAT regimes around the world. A VAT with border tax adjustments is
known as a destination-basis VAT, and a VAT without border tax adjustments is known as an origin-basis VAT. Virtually all VATs are destinationbasis.
Border tax adjustments under a broad-based VAT have no net present
value effect on trade or the present value of tax revenues because the present
value of exports has to be equal to the present value of imports. 199 Therefore, the present value of the rebate on exports must equal the present value
of the tax on imports.2°° There are timing differences in the flow of revenues
to the government - imports and exports with the same present value can
happen at different times - but the long-term effect has a net present value
of zero.

-g See id. at 44 tbl.3.1.
'99See Weisbach, supra note 7, at 618-22.
2'0 A key assumption is that the VAT covers all exports and imports.
8
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Because origin- and destination-based systems have the same net effect,
it usually does not matter which VAT system is used, apart from administrative cost and compliance issues. Moreover, it does not matter whether countries imposing a VAT harmonize with one another with respect to border tax
adjustments (again, apart from administrative or compliance issues).
These results do not hold for a specific excise tax like a carbon tax. We
consider four effects. First, border tax adjustments will have present value
revenue effects, because the present values of imports and exports of embedded carbon may not be the same. For example, carbon-intensive products
can be imported or exported in exchange for services or non-carbon-intensive goods. The taxes or rebates on carbon-intensive products will not be
offset by the taxes or rebates on the services or non-carbon-intensive goods.
For trade between two countries with harmonized carbon taxes, the main
effect of border tax adjustments is the recipient of the revenue: a destinationbasis system gives the revenue to the country where consumption takes
place, while an origin-basis system gives the revenue to the country where
production takes place.
Second, border tax adjustments and the location of tax remittance interact. In a world with cross-border trade in taxed products, it is no longer true
that the location of tax remittance matters only with respect to administrative
and compliance costs. Instead, countries that import carbon-intensive goods
receive revenues from a destination-based system while countries that export
carbon-intensive goods receive revenues from an origin-based system.
To illustrate, suppose that a carbon-intensive good like petroleum is
produced in three stages: extraction, refining, and consumption. Suppose
also, as is often the case, that extraction takes place in a different country
from refining and consumption. In particular, suppose that C, extracts oil
and sells it to C 2 in exchange for untaxed items. C 2 then refines and consumes the oil.
If C, collects the tax at the wellhead and there are no border adjustments, C, keeps the revenue and, depending on the incidence of the tax,
some combination of individuals in C, and C 2 bear the tax. If there are
border tax adjustments in both countries, C, rebates the taxes when the oil is
exported and C 2 imposes a tax when the oil is imported. In effect, the border
tax adjustment acts as an indirect transfer of the tax revenues from the extracting country to the consuming country. If, on the other hand, the tax is
collected at the refinery in the importing country or upon consumption, border tax adjustments have no effect because the tax is imposed in the same
country as the consumption. As with a sales tax levied at the retail stage,
there is no occasion for border tax adjustments to operate.
In general, if the good is produced in one country and consumed in
another, it matters if the producer or the consumer of the good remits the tax,
and it matters whether there are border tax adjustments. To foreshadow the
discussion below, if one concludes that border tax adjustments for a carbon
tax imposed upstream are illegal under current trade law, but a carbon tax
imposed directly on consumers would not be illegal (because there would be
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no border tax adjustments), that amounts to saying that the legal rules care
about the technical issue of which entity is responsible for tax remittance
rather than the economic effects of border tax adjustments. This seems
inappropriate.
Third, when there is trade between two countries with carbon taxes, the
system of border tax adjustments must be harmonized. Either both countries
need to impose border tax adjustments or neither should impose them.
Without harmonization, products can be subject to either double taxation or
no taxation, depending on the direction of trade. To illustrate, suppose that
both C, and C2 have carbon taxes, and that C, has no border tax adjustments
and C2 has them. If a product is produced in C1, is subject to a carbon tax in
C,, and then is exported to C2, there will be no rebate by C, since there are
no border tax adjustments. However, C2 will impose a tax at the border,
resulting in a double tax on the product. If a product is produced in C2 and
exported to C1, however, there would be no tax because C2 would rebate the
tax at the border and C, would not impose a border tax adjustment. Thus,
harmonization is needed.
Note that the same effect can occur in a world entirely without border
tax adjustments but where countries do not harmonize with regard to the
location of tax collection. For example, if C, imposes a tax upstream on
producers and C2 imposes a tax downstream on consumers, the result is exactly the same as in the preceding example: two taxes on the same emission,
even if neither C, nor C2 has border tax adjustments. Border tax adjustments
eliminate this problem because they ensure that the consuming country ends
up with the tax. In this sense, one can view border tax adjustments as simply
a mechanism for allowing the location of tax remittance to be determined
purely on administrative cost grounds. As we will see, however, there is a
trade-off, because border tax adjustments themselves are complex.
Finally, and most centrally, border tax adjustments ensure that the terms
of trade are consistent with the principle of comparative advantage where
one trading partner has a carbon price and the other does not. As noted
above, if two countries produce a good at the same cost, but one imposes a
carbon tax on production and the other does not, it is not correct to say that
the country without the tax has a comparative advantage and is therefore the
efficient producer of the good. The sole advantage of the non-taxing country
is simply its willingness to impose an externality on the rest of the world.
This is not an advantage that free trade laws should protect.
Another way to put this point is that the logic behind free trade relies on
well-functioning markets to allocate production of goods. When there is a
massive externality such as the emission of carbon, a Pigouvian tax on that
externality is entirely consistent with free trade, since the tax ensures that
prices are correct. Border tax adjustments are necessary to impose a
Pigouvian tax where there is an export from a non-taxing country.
One argument against border tax adjustments for carbon taxes is a slippery slope argument: if border tax adjustments are allowed in this case, they
would be allowed for a wide variety of measures with protectionist intent or
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effect. Any "trade plus" problem (trade plus labor, trade plus environment,
etc.) can be recast as an externality. For example, low-wage or child labor in
a trading partner can be thought of as creating externalities in the form of
empathy for the workers. A border tax would be necessary to internalize
this harm. Because almost anything can be cast as an externality, there appear to be no limits to this logic.
Slippery slope arguments rely on an institutional inability to distinguish
cases. The argument is that if one takes action x, one inevitably will take
action y, and action y is undesirable. This logic is spurious in the context of
climate change. Legal and tax systems around the world regularly must de-

cide which types of harms to recognize. For example, tort systems must
decide when an action by one party creates a compensable obligation.
Harms such as those expected from climate change - measurable and large
harms - are easily distinguished from other types of harms.
2.

Border Tax Adjustments and Renegade Countries

Carbon tax design and implementation will likely take place in a world

where at least some major producing countries do not agree to impose a tax
(or other carbon pricing regime) or do so only at minimal levels. Thus,
China, the United States, or some other major carbon producing country may
not find it in its interest to impose a carbon pricing regime when other countries do. Border tax adjustments can play a central role in such a world.
They have two effects: preventing "leakage" and encouraging renegade

countries to put a price on carbon.
Leakage in the carbon pricing context refers to the shifting of production of carbon-intensive goods to countries that do not impose a price or
otherwise regulate carbon. A producer in a country with a carbon tax might
move the location of production to a country without the tax and thereby

avoid the tax.20

20' A second reason why carbon leakage will occur in these circumstances is that if the

demand for energy goes down in the taxing countries because of the carbon tax, it will be
cheaper for producers in non-taxing countries to use energy-intensive production processes. If
the United States reduces its demand for oil, China may simply increase its demand, offsetting
the conservation efforts made in the United States.
The extent of carbon leakage is uncertain and is the subject of a number of studies. Modeling the problem is complex because it requires modeling production location decisions. Technological change also plays a role. See Mustafa Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market
Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 65 J. INT'L ECON. 421, 441 (2005) (arguing that carbon leakage from the Kyoto Protocol may actually be substantially more than 100%, meaning that
Kyoto would actually increase total carbon emissions). But see Corrado Di Maria & Edwin
van der Werf, Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with Directed Technical
Change, 39 ENVrL. & REsOURCE EcON. 55 (2008) (arguing that induced technological change
may counterbalance the effect of carbon prices on the terms of trade). The idea is that high
carbon prices in countries that impose a tax or quota change the relative profitability of investing in clean technology. There are numerous other studies of the issue. See, e.g., Stefan Felder
& Thomas F. Rutherford, UnilateralC0 2 Reductions and Carbon Leakage: The Consequences
of InternationalTrade in Oil and Basic Materials, 25 J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 162 (1993);
Sergey V. Paltsev, The Kyoto Protocol: Regional and Sectoral Contributions to the Carbon
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With a border tax adjustment, the tax cannot be avoided by altering the
location of production. Suppose that production originally takes place in C,
and some consumption takes place in each of C, and C2. If C, imposes a
carbon tax without border adjustments and C 2 does not impose a carbon tax,
shifting production to C2 avoids the tax entirely. If C, imposes border tax
adjustments, there is no advantage to shifting the location of production.
Consumption in C, will be taxed and consumption in C 2 will not be taxed
regardless of where production takes place. Thus, border tax adjustments
reduce this form of leakage.
The second, closely related, reason for having border tax adjustments is
to reduce the incentive for countries to behave as renegades. The focus in
this second argument is on the incentives for countries themselves as opposed to the incentives for industries. Border tax adjustments reduce the
benefit to renegade countries of remaining renegades because they would no
longer be able to attract production through their lack of a carbon tax.2 °2
A mixed regime of border tax adjustments for renegades and no adjustments (an origin-based system) for countries with harmonized taxes could be
used to actually create an incentive for renegades to price carbon. In particular, suppose that border tax adjustments were only applied to imports from
and exports to countries without a carbon pricing mechanism. Goods from a
country without a carbon pricing scheme exported to a country with a carbon
tax would face a border tax adjustment, and the revenues would go to the
consuming country. There would be no tax revenues and no advantage for
the non-pricing country. If the country priced carbon, however, it would be
able to keep the revenues - there would be no border adjustment - but not
face any additional disadvantage with respect to trade. Its own citizens, of
course, would now be subject to a tax on carbon consumption, but the tax
could be made revenue neutral through reductions in other taxes.
C.

Legal Issues with Border Tax Adjustments

The legal status of border tax adjustments under a carbon tax is uncertain. The problem with their legality relates to the detailed rules under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") governing border tax adjustments in general and the
scope of the so-called environmental exception. A detailed discussion of the
legal issues related to border tax adjustments for carbon taxes is well beyond
the scope of this paper. 103 Briefly, a tax on imports can only be imposed if
Leakage, 22(4) ENERGY J. 53 (2001); Thomas Eichner & RUdiger Pethig, Carbon Leakage, the
Green Paradoxand Perfect FutureMarkets (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2542, 2009), available at http://www.cesifo-group.de/-DocCIDL/cesifol-wp2542.pdf. Regardless of the extent
of leakage, however, it is clear that any leakage is inefficient and that border tax adjustments
prevent leakage through the location of production decisions.
202 This border tax adjustment is slightly different from that discussed in VAT systems, as
we propose that the United States would not rebate the tax on exports to renegade countries.
203See Gavin Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustment at
the Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395 (2004); Javier de Cendra, Can Emissions Trading
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there is an equivalent tax on like products in the home country. 2°4 There are
two key concepts: "likeness" and "on the product."
"Likeness," as currently construed by the GATT, does not include how
a product is produced. 2 5 Thus, a widget produced using coal as the source
of energy and an identical widget produced using hydroelectric power are
considered like products if the widgets themselves are alike. If a product is
produced in an exporting country using a different method from that used in
the importing country, the importing country may not be able to impose a
border tax based on the emissions created by the production of the good.
Conceivably, the likeness restriction would not be fatal because the
United States could impose a tax on imports equal to the tax imposed on
domestic production of the good. This would be imperfect - foreign producers with high emissions would face too low a tax and foreign producers
with low emissions too high a tax. Nevertheless, if the variance in emissions
from production of the good is not too great, it might be a reasonable
approach.
The second phrase in the GATT rule, however, may make this approach
illegal. The United States cannot impose a border tax adjustment equivalent
to the domestic tax unless the domestic tax is "on the product," 2°6 and it is
unclear whether a carbon tax is a tax "on the product." The object of taxation, carbon, is not the product being imported. Because the same product
can face different taxes based on the production mechanism (and under the
reasoning behind the "likeness" rule, production methods are not part of the
product), the tax is arguably not on the product at all. Therefore, even a tax
on imports based on domestic emissions when the product is produced may
not be legal. Tax rebates on exports are covered under a different set of
provisions governing illegal export subsidies. Rebates are allowed for prior
stage cumulative taxes borne by a like product when destined for local consumption. 07 The definition of this phrase is obscure, but under existing inserious concerns that a carbon tax would not fall
terpretations, there are
20 8
under the definition.
Finally, mixing origin- and destination-based systems to create an incentive for renegade countries to impose a pricing regime would arguably
Schemes Be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-at-vis WTO Law, 15
RECIEL 131, 135-36 (2006); Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A
Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 137, 143-52
(2007).
204 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. IIl, para. 2, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
205
See RAJ BHALA, MODERN GAT[ LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE 3-4, 639-40, 677-79 (2005); see also sources cited supra note 203.
206 By "on the product," we mean the tax is not imposed on the process used to produce
the product. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540-48 (2004).
207 See sources cited supra note 203.
208See sources cited supra note 203. The original intent of this phrase was to allow border
tax adjustments for the turnover taxes that many nations levied at that time. It has been interpreted to mean that border tax adjustments are allowed for VATs.
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fail the most favored nation ("MFN") requirement, which is a fundamental
tenet of trade law.2°9 In particular, renegade nations subject to a border tax
would argue that they are treated worse than other nations, contrary to MFN
principles.
An entirely separate and possibly more promising legal approach is to
claim that border tax adjustments are allowed under the so-called "environmental exception" to the normal GATT rules. Under the exception, trade
restrictions are allowed if needed to protect "human, animal, or plant life or
health" or if they relate "to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" and "such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 2 10 Any such trade restriction
under these rules must not be applied "in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade."21'

Interpretation of the environmental exception has been controversial.
There have been many attempts to prevent trading partners from engaging in
various practices viewed by the importing nation as environmentally inappropriate. For example, the United States attempted to impose rules to protect dolphins from tuna harvesting 12 and to protect turtles affected by shrimp
farming. 2 3 Most of these restrictions have been struck down, although the
U.S. turtle/shrimp rules were allowed. The reasoning behind these cases is
obscure - it is difficult to differentiate dolphin-safe tuna and turtle-safe
shrimp.

14

It is difficult to see why the legal rules should be interpreted to prevent
border tax adjustments. As noted above, direct taxation of the consumer
would have the same effect as taxation of production plus border tax adjustment, and there is no argument that direct taxation of consumers would be
an illegal trade barrier. Border tax adjustments are also consistent with, indeed mandated by, the principles behind free trade." 5
As noted above, a concern with border tax adjustments for carbon is the
problem of slippery slopes. Although carbon emissions are a very serious
international problem, allowing taxes on imports under an environmental or
human health argument could allow all kinds of poorly justified border
taxes. Without a clear set of principles delineating when border taxes for
209 See GATr,supra note 204, art.
21

1.

oGATT, supra note 204, art. XX.

211

Id.

222See Panel Report, United States -

Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3,
1991), GATI B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993).
213 See Appellate Body Report, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
214See sources cited supra note 203; BHALA, supra note 205, at 633-79 (discussing these
and other cases).
215 On the other hand, the GATT rules are often formalistic, drawing distinctions that do
not seem to make sense. Border tax adjustments are allowed for indirect taxes like the VAT
but not for economic equivalents, like wage taxes. See, e.g., Goh, supra note 203, at 399 &
n.13.
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externalities will be allowed, trade courts might be reluctant to allow any
such taxes. We do not think that this concern should prevent necessary border tax adjustments for a problem as serious as climate change.
D.

The Problem of Determining Carbon Content

Beyond legal issues, a central problem with border tax adjustments is
that it is difficult to determine the carbon content of a good when it is imported. This problem is especially salient for so-called non-Annex I (developing) countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. These countries do not submit regular, detailed carbon inventories, making it difficult to determine the carbon content of their exports. Moreover, these countries may not agree to impose a price on
6
21

carbon.

One possibility is that the border tax be imposed based on the carbon
that would have been emitted had the product been produced in the United
States.2" 7 This proposal gets around the "likeness" problem with a tax on
imports (although there remains the problem of whether a carbon tax is a tax
on the product). It also reduces the information problem both by using domestic information and by limiting the class of goods it applies to.
The major problem with this tax is that it will often be very inaccurate
because foreign production of a good often results in very different emissions from U.S. production. Figure 3 estimates the carbon intensity of steel
production in major producing countries. As can be seen, there are dramatic
differences. The U.S. tax on steel would be significantly too low for imports
of steel from Russia, for example.

216 For example, a number of studies have measured the carbon content of U.S. produced
goods relying on input-output accounts. See Hassett et al., supra note 56, at 163. Comparable
quality data that covers multiple years in an up-to-date fashion simply do not exist for China
and other major exporting developing countries.
217 For example, a similar proposal has been suggested jointly by American Electric Power
and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. For description and discussion, see
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, I 10TH CONG., CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION
DESIGN WRITE PAPER: COMPETrVENESS CONCERNS/ENGAGING DEVELOPING CouNTRIES 8-10
(2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/PDF/
selectedjlegislation/WhitePaper.Competitiveness.01 3108.pdf.
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than the intenSimilarly, U.S. carbon intensity for chemicals is often higher
219
sity in other countries, producing too high a border tax.
On a related matter, a tax based on U.S. emissions would not create any

incentive for foreign producers to substitute low-emission production techniques for high-emission production techniques. The tax would remain the
is otherwise less desirable,
same, so if a low-emission production technique
220
the tax will not induce the needed switching.

An alternative system would be to base border tax adjustments on estimates of average emissions in the exporting nation from production of a
given good. This would require information about production techniques

and energy systems abroad at the national level but not at the firm level.
While possibly more information-intensive than basing the tax on the importing country's emissions, it is potentially more accurate. Thus, the border

taxes for steel would reflect the national differences illustrated in Figure 3.
The main question will be the availability and reliability of national-level
data for developing countries. In addition, this approach runs 22directly into
the legal problem with basing taxes on production techniques. '

218 HOUsER ET AL., supra note 193, at 47 (copyright Peterson Institute, used by
permission). The darker (left-hand) bars represent direct emissions, and the lighter (righthand) bars represent the sum of direct and indirect emissions.
219 See id. at 48-49.

220 An additional problem might arise if emissions from production of a good vary widely
in the United States. It would then be difficult to determine which production system to base
the border tax on.
221The system must ensure that the calculation method is the same for both domestic and
foreign producers (i.e., how the domestic level is set must be the same as how the foreign level
is set). Otherwise, the system will encounter the same trade law conflicts seen in the Reformulated Gasoline case. See Appellate Body Report, UnitedStates - Standardsfor Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); see also BHALA, supra note 205,
at 648-58.
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Yet another refinement would be to allow individual exporting firms to
provide information proving that they are below their national averages. A
particularly efficient firm, therefore, could get a lower border tax, creating
an incentive to shift to more efficient technologies.
Any border tax adjustment, whether based on importing country information, exporting country information, or firm-level information, will require significant information gathering, documentation, categorization, and
recordkeeping. Without border tax adjustments, a carbon tax could cover
80% of U.S. emissions by taxing roughly 3000 companies and could cover
an even larger fraction without imposing a significant additional burden. If
border tax adjustments are added, the United States would need records of
carbon emissions from a wide variety of activities. Dispute resolution mechanisms would also be needed. Because technology changes all the time,
disputes would persist.
By way of analogy, consider how hard carbon footprint labeling has
been.222 The problem for determining proper border tax adjustments is essentially the same. The carbon tax, which looked so simple, suddenly becomes a very difficult administrative exercise.
E.

Summary

The above discussion leads us to the following conclusions. Border tax
adjustments may be necessary, but only for trade with countries without a
carbon price. Moreover, they are likely to be very complicated to administer
and legally suspect. Therefore, for trade within the set of countries with an
adequate carbon price, an origin-basis system (one without border tax adjustments) is preferable. The major effect of this choice is to allocate carbon tax
revenues to countries producing carbon-intensive goods instead of to countries consuming carbon-intensive goods.
For imports from countries without an adequate carbon price, the
United States most likely would need to impose a border tax based on either
the U.S. or foreign production method to prevent leakage. Moreover, when
combined with the origin-basis system, a border tax adjustment creates an
incentive for these countries to impose a carbon price. By imposing a carbon price, they would effectively get the revenue that the United States
would otherwise receive because of the border tax. Limiting border tax adjustments to the most carbon-intensive goods and goods where the production is particularly mobile might help reduce the administrative cost.
However, it would increase "rent-seeking" costs as individual industries
lobby for border tax adjustments.
A more difficult issue is whether to allow rebates for exports to countries without an adequate carbon price. Not allowing rebates may significantly reduce the administrative complexity of the system. The idea would
222

See, e.g., Not on the Label: The Environment, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2007, at 90.
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be that the United States generally has an origin-basis system and does not
allow rebates. The border tax on the import is imposed only as a substitute
for the carbon price that was not imposed in the producing country, and this
border tax upon import does not warrant a corresponding rebate on export.
Without rebates on export, however, there would be an incentive to
shift production to countries without a carbon price to the extent that the
goods are consumed there. For example, suppose that a producer in the
United States is exporting a carbon-intensive good to a country without a
carbon price. If the United States does not give a rebate of the carbon tax on
export, the producer could shift the production to the foreign country to
avoid the tax. A second problem is that there could be double taxation under
certain circumstances: if raw materials subject to a carbon tax are exported
to a country without carbon pricing, made into final goods and imported into
a country with a carbon price, there would be a risk of imposing the carbon
tax twice. Administering a system to prevent such double taxation would be
complex. Finally, a one-way system of taxes on import without rebates on
export might be harder to justify under the GATT/WTO system. If these
problems are severe, the United States could offer rebates for exports to
countries without a carbon price. As with imports, the United States could
reduce administrative costs by limiting rebates to the most carbon-intensive
goods.
VI.

INTERACTION wiTH EXISTING DOMESTIC TAXES AND REGULATIONS

There are a large number of regimes in the United States that affect
carbon emissions, from various command-and-control regulations to incentives and taxes. An important question in implementing a carbon tax is how
it interacts with existing rules. In this Part, we offer a brief review of the
relevant existing regimes and a discussion of whether and how they would
need to be modified if the United States instituted a broad-based carbon tax.
We have already noted that the United States imposes a tax on motor
fuels. We argued that this should remain in place if a carbon tax is enacted
on the basis that the motor fuels taxes correct for externalities from driving
not related to climate change.22
The major form of support for renewable energy production in the
United States is the system of production tax credits ("PTCs") for renewable
power enacted in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.224 PTCs are provided for
qualifying facilities (wind power, biomass, and geothermal, among other
sources) for ten years at a rate of 1.5€ per kilowatt-hour ("kWh").225 PTCs
have generally been viewed as successful except for the uncertainty sur223 See discussion supra Part II.B.4.

224 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
225 See Metcalf, supra note 11, at 161 (describing federal energy tax policies in detail and
providing a levelized cost analysis of the benefit of these subsidies); Carlson & Metcalf, supra
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rounding their congressional renewal every two years. Congressional delays
have twice led to their temporary expiration with a consequent fall in invest226

ment in the following year.
The role of PTCs is to reduce the price of electricity generated from

renewable sources relative to the price of fossil- or nuclear-fueled electricity.
A carbon tax would also lower the relative price of non-fossil-fueled electricity compared to that of fossil-fueled electricity, but by raising the cost of
the latter rather than by subsidizing the former. A tax-based approach has
two advantages over the PTC approach. First, the carbon tax raises the cost
of electricity on average while the PTC lowers it on average. The tax then
provides an additional mechanism to reduce carbon emissions by reducing
overall demand for electricity rather than stimulating it as the PTC subsidy
does. Second, the carbon tax creates a price differential among fossil fuels
based on their carbon content. Studies have shown that an early response to
carbon pricing is fuel substitution of natural gas for coal in the electric utility
industry. 227 These considerations all suggest that the appropriate policy
would be to eliminate PTCs if a carbon tax were enacted.
A second regulatory approach at the federal level is the mandating of
minimum fuel efficiency standards through the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy ("CAFE") program. CAFE mandates fleet standards for automobiles and light trucks. CAFE standards were significantly tightened in the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,228 which will raise the fleet
average from the current level of 26.7 miles per gallon ("mpg") in 2007 to
35 mpg by 2020.229
Ellerman, Jacoby, and Zimmerman consider how CAFE standards
could be integrated into a cap-and-trade system.2 30 They estimate that the
cost of carbon emission reductions through CAFE is in the neighborhood of
$25 per ton of CO 2e, 23' significantly higher than estimates of initial tradable

note 151, at 481 (discussing the interaction between energy credits and the corporate alternative minimum tax).
226 Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) (Statement of Ryan Wiser, Scientist, Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l
Lab.), availableat http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMS/reports/wiser-senate-test-4-07.pdf.
227 METCALF ET AL.,

supra note 56, at 36.

221Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).
229 Prior to the 2007 Act, separate standards existed for automobiles and light trucks. In
2007 the standards were 27.5 mpg and 22.2 mpg respectively with a realized fleet average of
26.7 mpg. For fleet efficiency data and CAFE standards, see NAT!L HIGHWAY TkAFFiC SAFETY
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSp., NVS-220, SUMMARY OF FUEL ECONOMY PERFORMANCE
(2008), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov (follow "Fuel Economy" hyperlink; then follow
of Fuel Economy Performance, Nov. 2008" hyperlink).
"Summary
23
1A. DENNY ELLERMAN, HENRY D. JACOBY & MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN, BRINGING
TRANSPORTATION INTO A CAP-AND-ThADE REGIME (2006), available at http://mit.edu/global
change/www/MITJPSPGCRptl 36.pdf.
131Id. at 7. Ellerman et al. estimate that the penalty automakers face for violating the
CAFE standards equates to a price of $90 per ton of carbon, which is equivalent to a price of
$24.50 per ton CO 2e.
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permit prices under prominent legislative cap-and-trade proposals. 2 32 This

estimate helps make two points. First, sector-based regulatory policies that
are not integrated more broadly into a carbon reduction scheme can be very
expensive. Second, the early reductions in carbon emissions are likely to

occur in industry and electric utilities rather than in the transport sector.
Since the source of emissions has no bearing on damages associated with

2 33
climate change, sector-based approaches are likely to be quite inefficient.
At the sub-federal level, the number of state-level programs to control

GHG emissions or to encourage renewable energy programs is growing.
Thirty-four states have some form of renewable portfolio standard ("RPS")
mandating that a given percentage of electricity be provided by renewable

sources. 234 RPS programs generally mandate that electricity distributors or
retailers must obtain Renewable Energy Credits ("RECs") for a given percentage or amount of the electricity that they sell.235 A qualifying renewable
facility is provided a number of RECs based on its electricity production that
the facility may then sell in the REC market to distributors or retailers needing RECs to match their power sales.236 The sale of RECs provides a subsidy to renewable electricity generators.

A slightly different approach to supporting renewable electricity generation is a Feed-in Tariff ("FIT"). FITs require utilities to purchase power
from qualifying facilities at a fixed rate (or premium) for a given number of
years. FITs differ from RPSs in setting a price for renewable electricity
rather than in requiring a fixed amount of new supply.2 37 They differ from

PTCs in two important ways. First, they can be designed to provide a price
guarantee rather than a fixed premium. 38 This has two benefits. If the generation price of competing fossil fuel generators falls, the FIT subsidy rises
to maintain a fixed purchase price. This provides price stability to investors.
232 For projections of permit prices under selected cap-and-trade proposals, see PALTSEV

supra note 136, at 29. For an example of one such legislative proposal (post-dating the
Paltsev et al. analysis), see the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong.
(2008).
233Other pollutants or market failures may provide a rationale for reducing oil consumption or tailpipe emissions. This simply reflects the fact that multiple instruments are generally
needed to address multiple market failures.
34 See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Rules, Regulations &
Policies for Renewable Energy, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables (follow "Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
235 For a description of the market for these credits, see David Berry, The Market for
Tradable
Renewable Energy Credits, 42 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 369 (2002).
236
Id. at 370.
231 In this sense the two instruments correspond to subsidy versions of price and quantity
controls.
238 FITs have been constructed to provide a price premium or a fixed price. European
FITs have generally been of the fixed price rather than premium type. See Metcalf, supra note
49, at 2 (discussing European FITs); see also WILSON RICKERSON, FLORIAN BENNHOLD &
JAMES BRADBURY, FEED-IN TARIFFS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE USA A POLICY UPDATE 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.boell.org/Pubsread.cfm?read= 169 (discussing possible use of FITs in the United States).
ET AL.,
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On the other hand, if competing generation prices rise, the FIT subsidy
phases out and so reduces the cost to ratepayers. Second, while PTCs are
subsidized by the federal government and subject to reauthorization every
two years, FITs are subsidized by ratepayers. This may reduce politically
motivated price volatility, which has occurred with PTCs in recent years.23 9
RPS and FIT programs serve to support renewable electricity generation. Unlike PTCs, they raise the average price of electricity, thereby providing a demand-side reduction in emissions. Unlike a carbon tax, however,
they are sector-based policies and thus will not necessarily lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across different sources of carbon, a
necessary condition for efficiency in carbon emission policy. An important
federalism question also arises with the adoption of a federal carbon tax.
Should the tax supplant these state-level policies or coexist with them? For
the RPS program, a national carbon tax would reduce the value of RECs by
the magnitude of the carbon tax. 240 As discussed in Part II.C. with respect to
the transition to a carbon tax, governments should not give compensation for
takings of this sort.24' For the FIT program, the carbon tax would simply
replace a portion (or all) of the FIT subsidy. To see this, imagine that a
natural gas power plant is the marginal fuel source and produces electricity
at a total cost (including return to capital) of 6¢ per kWh. A wind generator
in contrast produces electricity at a total cost of 9¢ per kWh. The FIT subsidy would be 30 per kWh for the wind facility, funded by ratepayers of the
utility purchasing the wind power. Now consider a carbon tax that raises the
total cost of the gas-generated electricity from 60 per kWh to 8.5¢ per kWh.
The FIT subsidy automatically drops to 0.5¢ per kWh on the wind-generated
electricity.
A third regulatory regime of importance is the emerging carbon capand-trade programs at the state or regional level. The two most significant to
date are the Global Warming Solutions Act in California and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI") in the Northeast.2 42 The California Act
establishes a statewide emissions cap in 2020 equal to 1990 levels. 243 The
California Air Resources Board, the agency tasked with implementing this
law, has recommended a mix of instruments to meet this goal, including a
cap-and-trade system. 244 The RGGI initiative builds on state-level initiatives
239 See Ryan Wiser, Mark Bolinger & Galen Barbose, Using the Federal Production Tax
Credit to Build a Durable Market for Wind Power in the United States, ELECTRICrrY J., Nov.
2007, at 77, 81.
240 If the RPS program were abolished upon enactment of a carbon tax, the value of RECs
would go to zero.
241See discussion supra Part II.C.
242 See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§§ 38500-38599 (West 2006); Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://rggi.org/
about (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
243 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2006).
2
CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CHANGE 30-38 (2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/psp.pdf.
The proposed plan was approved in December 2008. See Press Release, Cal. Air Res. Bd.,
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to cap emissions from the electric power sector in their states. RGGI estab2 45
lishes a regional trading system to reduce costs among participating states.
In the first phase, it caps emissions at current levels by 2009.246 Current
emissions are defined as 188 million short tons of CO 2 , roughly 4% above
average regional emissions from 2000 to 2004.247 It would then reduce
emissions gradually to achieve a 10% reduction from current levels by
2018.248
In addition to RGGI, the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord was established in November 2007 with six states and one Canadian
province participating. 249 A separate Western Climate Initiative has recently

set a goal of a 15% reduction below 2005 levels by 2020.250
A similar issue arises with regional or state cap-and-trade programs as
with RPS programs upon enactment of a carbon tax. If a federal tax must be
paid on emissions for which a state or regional permit is required, the value
of the permit will fall by the amount of the tax (or to zero, whichever is
less). States might argue that the carbon tax should not apply to emissions
subject to state or regional permits. This would be equivalent to carbon tax
revenues being levied on all emissions and rebated to holders of state or
regional cap-and-trade permits. This would be a mistake as it confers a
windfall gain on holders of state or regional permits. This creates efficiency
losses and has regressive distributional implications.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Most carbon pricing regimes are imposed on relatively narrow bases
and are imposed midstream, on industrial users of energy. Moreover, the
trend seems to be in the direction of a cap-and-trade system. We propose a
different approach here. For reasons long established in the literature, a carbon tax is preferable to a cap-and-trade system. We show that a well-implemented carbon tax imposed upstream can easily cover 80% of U.S.
emissions and can likely cover almost 90% with a modest additional cost.
The benefits of the broad base and lower compliance costs are likely to be

significant.

ARB Says Yes to Climate Action Plan (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.govl
newsrellnrl2ll08.htm.
245 Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 243.
24 6
REo'. GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO 2 BUDGET ThADING PROGRAM 2 (2007), available
247 Id. at 2 n.4.

at http://www.rggi.org/docs/program.summary_10_07.pdf.

248 Id. at 2.
249

See MIDWESTERN

GOVERNORS

AssN,

MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS

AccoRD (2007),

available at http://www.midwestemaccord.org/midwesterngreenhousegasreductionaccord.pdf.
250

WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW: THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE'S CAP-

AND-TRADE PROGRAM DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS

(2009), available at

climateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O 104F19872.pdf.
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